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Introduction 
 
Housing subsidies exist in almost every country in the world. Meanwhile, in most countries 
pursuing housing reforms, there is a growing need for integrating various interventions into 
comprehensive and explicitly articulated housing strategies. This is reinforced by fiscal needs to 
trim public spending and thus focus budgetary subsidies on better targeted household categories.  
 
The efficiency and equity performances of particular types of housing subsidies have been 
studied for a long time.
1 On the other hand, monographs of the entire housing subsidy system in a 
specific country, or comparisons of specific subsidy instruments across countries, are often 
undertaken by academics and development agencies. These studies essentially analyze how the 
different types of subsidies fit together, where the leakages are, and who captures the subsidies, 
often with the purpose of reforming the housing subsidy systems. Such studies make abundant 
use of public finance criteria to assess the performance of housing subsidies. Thus, it is generally 
possible to assess the “quality” of particular types of housing subsidies based on simple notions 
of public finance. However, the criteria used differ from one study to the next.
2 
 
At a different level, while analysts and policy-makers usually focus on comparing housing 
subsidy systems across countries, no systematic framework seems to exist to easily compare 
packages of housing subsidy systems.  
 
The main reasons for this apparent omission can be summarized as follows: 
 
•  The intrinsic complexity of the housing subsidy systems may encompass dozens of 
different channels
3 with sometimes highly idiosyncratic features, which together make 
cross-country system comparisons difficult
4. 
 
•  Different levels of development between countries often preclude an immediate ranking 
of “good” versus “bad” systems. The relevance as well as the economic efficiency of a 
particular housing subsidy program depend on many factors, including the level of 
poverty in the country, the development of mortgage markets, the importance of the 
banking system, and the land titling system. Thus, comparing housing subsidies across 
countries on the basis of gross figures alone may lead to conclusions that are not 
operational in terms of policy recommendations. 
 
The goal of this paper is to provide an organizing set of principles for evaluating the maze of 
subsidies affecting the housing sector. The paper thus aims at providing operational criteria 
allowing comparisons to be drawn between housing subsidy systems across countries, both at the 
individual program level as well as the aggregate level. The principles guiding our analysis are 
the following: 
 
                                                 
1 Examples of studies which have focused on particular programs are Crew-Cutts and Olsen (2002) on 
section 8 housing vouchers, and Gyourko and Linnemann, (1989) on public rental housing in the US. 
2 Many studies have focused on evaluation of housing subsidies. Some of them are quoted in this paper. For 
a general overview and country examples, the reader should consult Buckley and Mayo (1989), Conway et 
al. (1996), Gilbert (2004), Mayo and Gross (1987), Merrill et al. (1999), Struyk (2000), and the World 
Bank (1993). 
3 To quote but a few: direct subsidies  to rental or ownership, tax cuts on mortgage interest,  provision of  
plots of land at below market prices, and all subsidies to legal producers. 
4 One exception is Mayo (1986), who compares the US and German systems.   4
•  To identify a few simple, basic principles of public finance to provide an assessment grid 
for all types of housing subsidies, and which cover the whole range of issues deemed 
relevant by experts and policy-makers; and  
 
•  To give an operational content to those principles by trying to provide empirical 
measures which can be retrieved from existing programs. 
 
Our contribution consists in examining the assessment criteria used by different authors and 
systematically reviewing them. Hence, we are ultimately presenting a “map” of criteria which 
covers the most noteworthy topics in terms of operational analyses.  
 
The paper provides a tentative solution to the cross-country comparison of subsidy systems by 
presenting a method to aggregate the “quality diagnoses” made at the individual program level 
into country level diagnoses.
5 Ultimately, we would like to provide policy-makers with a simple 




The aggregation technique, which consists in weighting scores obtained by individual programs 
on a criterion by the share of each program in the country’s expenditures on housing subsidies, 
offers a simple way to visualize the main features of a subsidy system, as well as the impacts on 
the system of reforms or improvements of particular programs. In terms of policy advice, this 
type of weighting is helpful, since in a reform of the subsidy system, priority should be given to 
the parts of the system generating the higher losses. Those need not be the most inefficient parts 
of the package, if the latter weigh little in the overall subsidy package. 
 
To illustrate the concrete implementation of our method, we have applied our framework to the 
housing subsidy system prevailing in Morocco in 1995 and 2004. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Part I is devoted to the description of the 
methodology. The first section briefly reviews the economics of housing subsidies. The second 
section defines the criteria to be applied to particular housing subsidy programs, associated 
measures and measurement problems. Section 3 presents the aggregation method and its 
implementation. Part II illustrates the application of the framework by reviewing the housing 
subsidy system in Morocco. The first section gives an overview of the housing sector in Morocco. 
In section 2, we describe the housing subsidy system prevailing in Morocco in 1995. Section 3 
evaluates the various subsidy programs under the nine evaluation criteria selected and presents 
aggregate highlights. Section 4 briefly surveys the main changes having affected the housing 
policy in Morocco from 1995 to the present. The newly introduced instruments are evaluated in 
section 5. Section 6 uses aggregate ratings to compare the housing subsidy systems in 1995 and in 
2004. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Supposing one is able to assess the “quality” of specific housing subsidy programs in a particular country, 
the overall “quality” of the subsidy system will depend on the mix of  housing subsidies prevailing at that 
time in the country. If two countries use the same two subsidy types but with a different mix, the “quality” 
of the housing subsidy system will be higher for the country whose share of the best-performing type of 
subsidies is higher. 
6 For example, through diagrams showing the performance of housing subsidy systems on several axes, 
such as those used by the World Bank in country assessments (see also Figure 2).  
   5
Part I : Methodology 
 
1) Background and Applied Literature on Housing Subsidies 
 
This section begins with a basic overview of the economic justifications for housing subsidies and 
their evolution until now. We then focus on the economic impact of housing subsidies, through 
the standard classification of policy effects given by Musgrave (1959). 
 
Economic Justifications for Housing Subsidies
7  
 
Housing has typically received a lot of attention from policy makers for a number of years, if 
merely from the basic needs perspective. Historically, it seems that government intervention in 
housing was an externality argument: in large cities such as Paris at the end of the nineteenth 
century, the population density was well over 20,000 inhabitants per square kilometer. 
Recognition that overcrowding, lack of appropriate water and sanitation, and poor building 
conditions were at the root of epidemics and health hazards paved the way for government 
intervention in housing, for example in the form of units constructed by State-owned 
cooperatives. The public health argument is still valid today for some less developed countries, 
where population density and health hazards are still comparable to or higher than in Europe a 
hundred years ago. 
 
In European countries, state intervention in housing continued during the first half of the 
twentieth century. Two successive wars caused massive destruction of housing units and many 
governments felt responsible for alleviating the housing shortage. Thirty years later, the picture 
had changed dramatically. Serious housing shortages were no longer an issue, and justification 
for state-funded housing subsidies had become harder to support. In some countries, it had 
become clear that structural shortages were due above all to an inadequate legal and regulatory 
environment, such as very stringent rent controls. In his famous survey, Rosen (1985) asks 
whether housing subsidies are not just either a manifestation of paternalism from the state or an 
indirect means for the federal government to subsidize the construction sector.
8 These differing 
rationales for state intervention in the housing sector resulted in two main themes of discussion 
and research: 
 
•  Positive externalities generated by housing. If families are not fully aware of the benefits
9 
they or the community get from their consuming housing of good quality, housing will be 
produced in insufficient quality/quantity. Therefore, there is clearly room for government 
intervention in the housing sector. Thus, a whole branch of empirical economics has been 
devoted to the identification of those externalities, though mainly in developed countries 
(for a recent review, see Dietz and Haurin, 2003).  
 
•  Market imperfections and incompleteness. If the poor do not have access to financial 
markets and relevant information, or are discriminated against, housing subsidies 
targeting the most disadvantaged sections of the population can be justified. 
Imperfections in other markets such as the job market also justify housing as a privileged 
means of intervention, considering the “safety net” role played by housing. 
                                                 
7 This section is not intended to be exhaustive in any way.  The reader should refer to Rosen (1985), Mayo 
(1986) and Hoek-Smith and Diamond (2003), among others. 
8 In France, subsidizing construction is almost natural and beyond question. As the saying goes, “when 
construction is well, everything is well”. 
9 In the form of lower crime rates, better results of children in school, better health, etc.   6
 
The traditional justification of housing subsidies, which relies on the “merit good” aspect of 
housing (see e.g. Mayo, 1986), still has a powerful appeal in many countries. This is especially 
true in developing countries where a large portion of households does not have access to basic 
utilities or shelter. In the case of international development institutions, the fact that housing is 
seen as a merit may be considered the main reason for including housing in the Millennium 
Development Goals.  
 
Other considerations may, of course, apply. For a government with a vertical equity 
preoccupation, housing subsidies may serve as a redistribution device. When the government can 
observe incomes, an income tax should suffice to achieve redistribution (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 
1976).
10 However, this conclusion is of little practical relevance in developing countries where 
income and wealth are not easily observable for a large part of the population, due to the 
importance of informal markets and the absence of monitoring systems. In that case, subsidizing 
housing directly could lead to better targeted transfers. 
  
Through the lessons learned by specific countries, there has also been a growing consensus that 
the institutional and regulatory environment in which the housing market develops is of primary 
importance to understand its shortfalls or successes. A well-functioning land market, for example, 
is now recognized as necessary for a fluid housing market and affordable prices, above and 
beyond any particular type of housing subsidy. Reflecting this new consensus, reforming 
institutions, rather than intervening directly on physical or subsidy programs, has been a growing 




Economic effects of housing subsidies. 
 
Based on the classification developed by Musgrave (1959), government taxes and expenditures 
(or other policies) can have three different effects on the economy: 
•  Allocation. As a result of any policy, the allocation of resources is changed, i.e. the mix of 
goods and services produced by the economy is altered. Related to this notion is the question 
of efficiency of the economy. 
•  Distribution. Many government policies aimed at redistributing resources – some programs 
are explicitly aimed at redistributing income from the rich to the poor. The fundamental 
question is then “How do policies change the distribution of income within the economy ?”. 
•  Stabilization. The overall level of government expenditures and taxes can have important 
effects on the aggregate level of employment, output, and prices.  
 
Stabilization, although important, will not be discussed in detail here. The two other criteria can 
be used to describe the effects of housing subsidies and classify the existing literature on this 
topic. Throughout, we will use some typical examples of housing subsidies to illustrate specific 
points. 
 
                                                 
10 This conclusion does not hold if there are positive externalities associated to housing. In that case 
housing subsidies could perform better than income subsidies, because they directly affect the housing 
prices perceived by households. 
   7
Allocation 
 
Housing subsidies, like all subsidies, usually distort the price system faced by firms and 
households, thus changing the equilibrium output of goods and services.
11 Compared with other 
subsidies, studying the distortions caused by housing subsidies to the price system and the 
economy is particularly important because of:  
  
i.  The quantitative importance of housing subsidies in the overall tax and expenditure 
system in most countries; and 
 
ii.  The importance of housing as a consumption good and as an asset for households. 
Housing typically represents between 20 and 50 % of total consumption and between 
40 and 70 % of average household wealth. 
 
Thus, the system of housing subsidies as a whole can be expected to have important effects on 
many margins, potentially causing huge distortions in the allocation of resources in the economy. 
On the household side, the margins most likely to be affected are: 
 
i.  Consumption of housing versus consumption of other goods. A wide range of 
housing subsidies can be thought of as equivalent to changes in the price of housing 
relative to the price of other consumption goods. This results in changes in the 
consumption bundles chosen by those affected by the subsidy. Usually, the subsidy 
results in a lower price of housing compared to other goods. If housing is a normal 
good, both the substitution effect and the income effect are positive, and housing is 
consumed in greater quantity. This topic has received a great deal of attention in 
empirical literature (see, for example, Malpezzi and Vandell, 2002, Sinai and 
Waldfogel, 2002). 
 
ii.  Consumption versus saving. Here again, we can identify at least two different effects:  
by lowering the price of housing today, a housing subsidy may alter the arbitrage 
between present and future consumption. However, housing prices may also decrease 
in future. Certain types of housing subsidies, such as up front subsidies to ownership 
which include eligibility conditions such as a minimum down payment requirements, 
can oblige households to save more in order to meet the constraint. 
 
iii.  Composition of the household’s portfolio. Tax treatment, government investment in 
housing or direct subsidies to homeownership
12 may cause households to invest more 
in housing, relative to other types of investment, than would otherwise be the case.  
This issue also affects the production side. On this subject, see the discussion in 
Japelli and Pistaferri (2002), and the paper by Duebel (2000). 
 
iv.  Labor supply. As for any other good, the household’s labor supply is affected by the 
subsidy system. This may happen for “direct” reasons (i.e. the price of housing 
                                                 
11 There are very few studies we are aware of on the effect of housing subsidies on prices. One exception is 
Susin (2001), who studied the effect of section 8 vouchers on rents from a panel sample of American cities.  
In the French case, Laferrère and Le Blanc (2004) show how personal housing subsidies for renters affect 
rents. 
12 Examples of favorable tax treatment for ownership include income tax deductibility of the mortgage 
interests, provisions for non taxation of capital gains on housing, low tax rates on housing bequests, etc.    8
changes, and so does the labor supply of the household), or for indirect reasons.
13 
Housing subsidies are no exception to this rule, even though their effects on labor 
supply have received little attention compared to subsidies for families or minimum 
income programs, which are of similar magnitude. A study on the effect of section 8 
vouchers on the labor supply in the United States can be found in Currie and 
Yelowitz (1998) and Fischer (2000). Ideally, the effect of housing subsidies on labor 
supply should not be examined independently, but as a component of the tax-benefit 
system. For such an approach in France, see Laroque and Salanié (1999). 
 
On the production side, the margins most likely to be affected may be: 
 
i.  Self-construction versus buying dwellings from construction companies. In many 
developing countries, self-construction represents an important part, if not the bulk, 
of construction, and more so in the poorest parts of the population. Construction 
subsidies, which often operate via low tax rates on inputs or labor, cover only large 
firms operating in the formal job market and building mid-range or high standard 
housing, leaving self-construction out of the loop. This results in both allocation 
distortion and regressive redistribution. 
 
ii.  New construction versus maintenance and upgrading. This point is closely related to 
point i). Many governments still want to stimulate new construction because of 
structural deficits in housing units, or because of efficient lobbying by the 
construction industry, through housing subsidy programs theoretically dedicated to 
the poor. However, the poor usually cannot afford new units, which results in badly 
targeted subsidies (see paragraph below). The result is often lack of  maintenance 
and/or upgrading of existing units.
14 
 
iii.  Housing investment versus investment in other sectors. By altering the returns on 
investment in the housing sector, supply-side policies cause investment to shift from 
other sectors to the housing sector. Though fairly obvious, this is not often fully taken 
into account in many countries where all sectors are trying to encourage investment. 
Eventually, competition between sectors may result in all sectors being worse off and 
to a decrease in overall tax revenues.
15 One key issue is the degree of openness of the 
country to foreign investment. An example of applied work on this topic is the study 
by Sewell, Mintz and Tsiopoulos (1995). 
 
                                                 
13 E.g., in France, public housing is obtained by applying to local authorities managing the public stock at 
the city level. The wait time for public dwellings can be very long, typically from one to two years. Moving 
from a city to another, a household previously housed in the public sector loses a low rent public dwelling 
and has to relocate in the private sector, at least temporarily. Those households thus have strong 
disincentives to move, even when they lose their jobs. This causes a poverty trap. On this issue, see 
McIennan et al. (1998). 
14 Moreover, when the housing shortage is caused by reasons such as land titling procedures or overly 
stringent urban land zoning regulations, this type of policy can be highly inefficient. In this case, the 
limiting factor is the elasticity of supply for land, not for housing units. Thus, the subsidy is likely to be 
captured by the construction sector, increasing the price of housing units. 
15 For example, until 1996, Morocco had five different investment codes for different sectors of the 
economy. To ensure neutrality of the tax system to investment flows, the five codes were abandoned and 
replaced by a new Investment Code identical for all the sectors of the economy. However, since 1996, 
many sectors (such as housing) have benefited from exemptions and special fiscal regimes, destroying the 
original purpose of the new Investment Code.   9
iv.  Public versus private construction. Subsidies to private or State-owned companies for 
public housing construction, in the form of tax rebates, land subsidies, or subsidized 
financing of projects, distort competition in the construction sector and can result in  
partial or total crowding out of private construction by public units.
16 The important 
variable then is the net effect, i.e., the number of additional units built because of the 
subsidy. In some cases, the net effect can be negative due to the monopoly resulting 
from the disappearance of unsubsidized firms from the market. This topic has been 





The concept of redistribution is fairly straightforward. The generic question “How do policies 
change the distribution of income in the economy?” can be broken down into several specific 
sub-questions. In particular, one is often concerned with vertical redistribution (are the transfer 
flows induced by the subsidy going from the rich to the poor, from decile y to decile z of the 
income distribution, etc.) and horizontal redistribution (comparing the situation of different 
household sub-groups in a particular income range before and after the redistribution caused by 
the subsidy).  
 
Evaluating the effects of a subsidy program on welfare is not always easy. For example, 
evaluating the long-term effects of unemployment training programs or education grants involves 
dynamic effects and requires intensive modeling. An entire branch of economic literature (the so-
called “evaluation literature’) is devoted to evaluating program effects (see Heckman, Ichimura, 
and Todd, 1997a, 1997b, for a good presentation). This literature has focused the attention not 
only on the effects of subsidies on beneficiaries, but also on non-beneficiaries and on the choices 
of households (or firms) between participation and non-participation in the programs. In the case 
of housing subsidies, this framework could be particularly relevant to measure the effects of 
programs such as land and services, which involve long-term dynamics. 
 
 
A specificity of developing countries: the formal / informal margins. 
 
When looking at developing countries, one has to take into account that in parallel with formal 
markets, informal markets very often exist, sometimes playing a more important role than their 
formal counterparts. The most obvious examples of such markets are: 
•  Parallel markets for land, either because of the existence of customary systems coexisting 
with “modern systems” (see World Bank, 2003), or because the formal procedures for 
titling and transactions are too complicated 
•  Limited access of households to the banking system and to credit for housing 
•  Underground rental and sub-rental markets 
•  Tax evasion and/or inadequate coverage of the tax system for households and firms 
•  Underground job market 
 
While the importance of some of these informal markets is well acknowledged in developed 
countries (e.g. underground labor supply), other markets have not been so developed as to justify 
the theoretical and/or empirical examination of their effects on the housing market. This is 
                                                 
16 In Morocco, the subsidies given to state-owned infrastructure and construction companies were so high 
that the private sector was totally excluded from the construction sector until some years ago.   10
unfortunate, since the existence of informal or parallel markets can have huge impacts on both the 
targeting of housing programs and the redistribution effects of housing subsidies in developing 
countries. This is mainly due to the fact that households or firms participating in the formal 
markets or systems are not generally the intended beneficiaries of housing subsidies. For 
example, fiscal subsidies for households, although well-targeted in principle, will always miss the 
fraction of the population that does not pay taxes. It is thus important to keep in mind that the 
existence of informal markets makes textbook evaluations of subsidy programs difficult to apply 
in developing countries. 
 
2) Basic Public Finance Criteria and Their Operational Relevance 
 
Apart from the two main economic criteria of efficiency and equity, which relate to allocation and 
distribution respectively, other public finance criteria are often used to analyze subsidy programs. 
Those criteria vary and may bear different names from one author to another. For example, 
Stiglitz (1988, p. 390-409) gives “the five desirable characteristics of any tax system”: economic 
efficiency, administrative simplicity, flexibility, political responsibility, and fairness. However 
Stiglitz’s categories are broad and each one encompasses different notions. Mayo (1986) and 
Hoek-Smith and Diamond (2003) provide a very thorough discussion of some of these and other 
criteria to evaluate housing subsidies. Based on those two studies, Buckley and Kalarickal (2004) 
evaluate five housing programs in Indian cities based on five criteria: targeting, efficiency, 
transparency, administrative simplicity and sustainability. In Struyk (2000), who presents 
evaluations of housing finance and subsidies in transitional countries, subsidies are judged 
according to the following criteria (p 40): openness and transparency, precise targeting, improved 
access, cost-effectiveness, administrative simplicity, cost control, and development impact. 
17 
 
Thus, based on the literature on evaluation of policy programs, the closest metaphor would be 
that of a “rainbow” of criteria: trying to cover the whole spectrum of interesting issues, many 
criteria arise, the number of which is somewhat arbitrary, and with a certain degree of 
overlapping between them. Since our primary goal in this paper is to provide a wide range of 
criteria to achieve completeness, i.e., permits a non-specialist to observe interesting areas, we 
chose to select a fairly high number of criteria. Specifically, we define and discuss the nine 
following criteria, which can be organized into three main categories: 
•  Administrative simplicity 
•  Incentives/ popularity/political accountability-responsibility 
•  Transparency 
 
•  Targeting / vertical equity (redistribution) 
•  Coverage/horizontal equity 
•  Efficiency 
 
•  Visibility 
•  Sustainability 
•  Flexibility 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the proximity and overlaps between our selected criteria, making the 
“rainbow” image more concrete. 
                                                 
17 Other criteria found in public finance textbooks (e.g. Browning and Browning, 1988) include individual 
freedom and paternalism. We considered those to be less useful in the case of housing subsidies than other 
criteria, and we have not elaborated on them.   11

























































We will now define the content of all the criteria, and to provide indicators that can be used to 
measure the degree of success of subsidy programs according to each specific criterion. As 
indicated below, no quantitative indicators may be available for certain criteria. 
 
Administrative Simplicity  
 
Administrative simplicity can have two interpretations. First, from the administration’s point of 
view : other things being equal, subsidy design should minimize social costs which include the 
government’s administration, monitoring and enforcement costs, but also all indirect costs, such 
as the time required for applicants to locate the appropriate office where to apply, to understand 
and to fill out the requested forms. Another potentially important indirect cost is the cost 
associated with legal disputes arising from the implementation of the program. From a practical 
point of view, it has to be noted that very often only direct costs are known. Since they are of no 
significant interest to governments, indirect costs are rarely known without ad hoc studies, even 
in the case of budgeted programs. 
 
A second way to comprehend administrative simplicity is from the potential recipients’ point of 
view. Some programs are so complicated that few potential users are even aware of their 
existence (this is particularly true for fiscal subsidies), or an “average” household or firm is 





Transparency refers to the clarity of the program’s eligibility and participation criteria and 
effective implementation by the responsible entities. Since this criterion is more qualitative than 
others, it might best be defined it through a number of questions: How clear are the rules for 
allocation of funds to the various states, to local governments? At the local government level, 
how are beneficiaries identified and selected under the programs? Are there well-defined 
eligibility criteria for the subsidies? Are those criteria acknowledged by the population? Are 
responsibilities in subsidy allocation clearly defined? Is subsidy distribution managed by an 
independent entity? Are any slots for program participation reserved for the administration or 
local authorities? As an example, the French public sector housing (HLM) would be poorly rated 
under these conditions (see Le Blanc and Laferrère, 2001). In contrast, Colombia’s program for 
up front subsidies to ownership (Vivienda de Interés Sociál, VIS) directly managed by the State 
would be rated very high, since distribution of amounts among regions, eligibility criteria, and 
criteria for selection of beneficiaries are explicit under the law. 
 
Incentives/ political responsibility / popularity :  
 
This criterion is perhaps the most qualitative of all. However, from a policy point of view, it is 
perhaps one of the most important. Two identically designed housing subsidy programs could 
perform very differently in two different countries, simply because in one country stakeholders 
(state, local governments, implementation agencies, recipients) do not have adequate incentives. 
Thus, the questions underlying this criterion might be the following: What are the incentives of 
stakeholders to use but not to abuse the subsidy? Are individuals or institutions responsible for 
choosing participants in the program accountable, and to whom? Are institutions in charge of the 
program’s implementation given adequate financial and technical means? Do entities in charge of 
the program have incentives to keep the program under control (financial mass, cost recovery, 
etc.)? How do recipients participate in the project? Does the program receive substantial support   13
from the public and from politicians? Who supports the program and who is against it? This 
notion is close to that of transparency, but also to administrative simplicity. 
 
Targeting / Vertical Equity :  
 
Vertical equity relates to the redistribution of income due to the subsidy system and can be 
explicit or implicit. Vertical equity is a classical public finance criterion (see Stiglitz, 1988), 
which is not limited to housing subsidies. One may or may not want to include it as a separate 
criterion, since it is very close to targeting, at least when working (as we do) under the implicit 
assumption of subsidies targeted to the poor.
18 However, computing (or qualitatively assessing) 
the distribution of transfers implied by a subsidy is necessary for assessing its targeting, coverage 
and efficiency. Thus, it may be worthwhile to draw the attention of policymakers to this broader 
issue, instead of focusing only on targeting.
19 
 
Targeting is traditionally measured by the proportion of transfer which reaches the intended 
beneficiaries. It is clear that the ability to define intended beneficiaries assumes the existence of a 
relatively precise housing strategy in the first place, which is not always the case.
20 In fact, 
targeting can be examined at many levels. At the national level, how are funds allocated to the 
various states? At the state level, what criteria are used for disbursing funds to local 
governments? And finally, at the local government level, how are beneficiaries identified and 
selected for the programs? In the context of housing subsidies which aim to improve housing 
conditions, another definition of targeting could be the proportion of the subsidy actually 




Coverage refers to the proportion of the target population effectively reached by the subsidy. 
Contrary to Buckley and Kalarickal (2004) we suggest isolating coverage from targeting. The two 
notions are different and good targeting and high coverage may be somewhat difficult to achieve 
simultaneously. It should be difficult to achieve perfect coverage for well-targeted subsidies, 
whereas loosely targeted subsidies could cover relatively well the target population, at the 
expense of higher costs and leakages to non-targeted groups. Coverage may also be related to 
horizontal equity issues, i.e., does the subsidy imply different treatments for different types of 
households / firms in the target population? Which sub-categories in the target population benefit 
most and least from the subsidy?  
 
                                                 
18 From a semantic point of view, "Targeting” refers to a (normative) precise policy objective, whereas 
“distribution” refers to a positive analysis tool. 
19 Another advantage of raising this issue is to obtain the data necessary to apply the framework used in the 
so-called evaluation literature. This branch of the literature (see Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997a, 
1997b, for a nice presentation) has focused the attention not only on the effects of subsidies on 
beneficiaries, but also on non-beneficiaries, and on the choices made by households between participation 
and non-participation. 
20 For example, in many developing countries, it is difficult to find an official statement concerning the 
purpose of tax breaks for homeowners going beyond the general objective “of facilitating home 
ownership”.   14
Efficiency:  
 
The economic notion of efficiency relates to the allocation of resources in the economy. Thus, the 
general question to be asked is “can the same resources be used more efficiently, and to what 
extent?” It should be apparent from our review in Section 1 that, in most cases, the answers to this 
question are not straightforward. Depending upon the type of subsidy program examined, relevant 
indicators for efficiency may differ or be difficult to identify. The correct theoretical answer to 
the question of efficiency was given by Debreu (1951), who introduced the notion of Coefficient 
of Resources Utilization (CRU). In any given economy, the CRU is the complement of only a 
fraction of resources “wasted”, i.e., the portion of resources which can be discarded while still 
able to ensure that all agents receive the same level of satisfaction as under the actual economy. 
For optimal economy, the CRU will be 1, since no resources are wasted. For sub-optimal 
economies, the CRU will be below 1. Debreu (1952) gives a formula for computing the CRU (the 
economic loss) when a system of small indirect taxes and subsidies is introduced in a Pareto 
optimal economy. The formula involves quantity and prices before and after subsidies are 
introduced, as well as the aggregate substitution matrix (consumption plus production) for the 
economy. 
 
Empirical application of Debreu’s formula in its most general form requires general equilibrium 
models. The computable general equilibrium (CGE) literature has been successful in developing 
practical models of the economy which can be used to assess the efficiency of alternative tax 
systems and their impacts on the economy. For example, Coady and Harris (2004) use such a 
model to estimate the effects of cash transfer programs in Mexico. Most of the time however, 
even so-called general equilibrium evaluations of welfare costs of subsidies have been undertaken 
within a simplified framework. Usually, housing is isolated from other goods. The model used 
depends on the focus of the analysis, and one particular margin affected by the subsidy is put 
forward. Perhaps the most studied case is that of US income tax deduction of mortgage interests. 
The efficiency impacts of this provision have been analyzed, both in terms of distortion between 
housing and other forms of investment, and in terms of intergenerational redistribution.
21  
 
As far as housing subsidies are concerned, the bulk of empirical estimations of consumer and 
producer welfare gains and losses have been undertaken using a partial equilibrium framework. 
Housing is isolated in the analysis and the general equilibrium effects are neglected. The two 
main assumptions for all evaluations are the following: 
•  The reference situation is Pareto optimal (no distortion of the housing market or 
elsewhere in the economy) 
•  A distortionary tax / subsidy is introduced on housing. 
 
a) Partial equilibrium of the housing market with producers and consumers 
 
In this case, one obtains the famous “Harberger triangle”, which sums up the loss of welfare for 
producers and consumers. When taxes are low and only second-order changes can be considered, 
the loss of welfare grows as the square of the tax rate increases. Harberger triangles have been 
used in a number of studies covering many different fields (see Hines, 1999, for a historical 
review and empirical references on Harberger triangles).
22 
                                                 
21 See Skinner, 1996, for a model focusing on the latter aspect, references and a discussion of the relevant 
margins to be considered in that case. 
22 The “correct” welfare measure for consumers is based on the concept of equivalent variation or 
compensating variation. Many empirical analyses, however, are based on uncompensated demand curves, 
which are more frequently estimated.   15
 
In the context of housing subsidies, the generic question relates to the portion of subsidies being 
captured by housing producers, rather than by consumers. Studies on this topic include Susin 
(2002) for section 8 housing vouchers in the United States, and Devereux and Lanot (2003) for 
mortgage interest tax relief in the United Kingdom. The latter paper is part of the literature on tax 
incidence, which by nature is closely related to the literature on evaluation of subsidy programs. 
 
b) Partial equilibrium on the housing market with only consumers  
 
Very often, only the consumer side is examined. In this case, one is concerned with recovering 
household preferences and computing the distribution of equivalent and compensating variations. 
This framework may be appropriate when issues of efficiency as well as redistribution for a 
particular subsidy are examined, and has been applied in many studies: for example, Olsen and 
Barton (1983) on rent control in New York City; Kraft and Olsen (1977), or Le Blanc and 
Laferrère (2001) on public sector housing, respectively, in the United States and in France; 
Koning and Ridder (1997) on rent assistance in the Netherlands. 
 
The partial equilibrium framework is also the main concern of policymakers, who often disregard 
overall losses for the economy, focusing instead on the effects of subsidies on housing production 
or consumption. Hence, as far as policy evaluation is concerned, major outcomes will be housing 
production or consumption changes occurring as a result of the policy. Moreover, specific studies 
focus on various economic margins. An appropriate estimate of program “efficiency” (though not 
in the coined economic sense) then becomes the leverage effect of a program, i.e., how much 
supplemental investment in housing will be generated by one dollar of subsidy?
23 The focus on 
the leverage effect has been particularly important in the evaluation of slum upgrading and site-
and-services programs (see for example Quigley, 1987).
24  
 
Often, particular data from administrative files or surveys are not available, and the estimation of 
models like those used in the papers mentioned above is not possible. When adequate data are 




Visibility refers to the degree of visibility of all costs of the subsidy for taxpayers and citizens. In 
order to measure visibility, one must first determine the actual subsidy cost and then determine 
how explicitly defined these costs are in the government’s budget. As a rule, costs are better 
known for subsidies on the State budget.
25 The cost of fiscal subsidies is often estimated because 
fiscal revenues are an important component of a country’s macroeconomic stability. In contrast, 
the cost of in-kind subsidies such as public housing or land are rarely estimated because the 
implied transfers are often implicit and do not appear on the main budget of the State or local 
authority. Thus, generally speaking, we can assess a decreasing degree of visibility to subsidies 
depending on their type and accounting method, as follows:  
•  subsidy on budget 
                                                 
23 There are many ways to estimate this type of impact, i.e., marginal or average impact, short-term vs. 
long-term impact, etc. 
24 This may be attributed to the importance of the “merit good” aspect of housing for international 
institutions financing such programs. 
25 However, this is often only true for direct costs, e.g., the amount of subsidy budgeted or distributed to 
beneficiaries during a given year. Indirect costs which are not the main preoccupation of governments, are 
rarely known without ad hoc studies, even for budget programs.    16
•  fiscal subsidy 
•  implicit subsidy / in-kind subsidy 
 
As a rule, the more visible the program, the more quantitative information will be available on it. 
From a policy point of view, improving the visibility of a program has significant benefits, such 
as better understanding of the full economic cost of providing housing assistance, better targeting 




This notion corresponds to the ease with which a particular program can be modified (parameters 
and / or implementation) or even terminated. This can be understood in the economic sense (can 
the program be modified or terminated without major disruptive effects on the economy?) or in 




It can be argued that “sustainability” is meaningless for an isolated policy because the 
government’s budget constraint implies a tradeoff between policy choices.
26 However, this 
criterion can be applied in the following sense: given the present economic situation and 
reasonable forecasts, will the policy still be feasible in ten years, or will it require major changes 
in design, or even be dropped? One common example concerns subsidies for housing 
construction through public land grants or sales to developers below market prices by the State. In 
many cases, this strategy is not sustainable because reserves of public land are typically limited, 
and there is no mechanism to ensure its renewal. Another generic example could be a substantial 
subsidy program for a limited number of people at the beginning of the program, but which could 
rapidly grow because of behavioral responses or political pressures, even to the point where 
budget expenditures are no longer sustainable.
27  
 
Another feature of sustainability, which also relates to flexibility, is the degree to which current 
expenditures on subsidies have lasting impacts on the State budget (i.e., the time persistence of 
expenditures). Two extreme examples are upfront subsidies for homeownership, which constitute 
one-shot expenses for governments, and subsidies on mortgage interest rates, which usually 
impact government expenditures for the entire life of the loans.
28 
 
Table 1 in the Appendix summarizes the above discussion. 
 
 
                                                 
26 Sustainability could also be defined as follows, (Buckley and Kalarickal, 2004): “whether the 
government can scale up the housing subsidy program to effectively address all the intended beneficiaries”.  
This definition is in the middle of our concept of sustainability and coverage.Coverage is not isolated as a 
criterion in their approach. 
27 The French programs of personal rental allowances (Allocations de Logement, AL, and Aide 
Personnalisée au Logement, APL) are a good example of unforeseen growth in the number of beneficiaries 
and State expenditures. 
28 Morocco again is a good example of this. Interest rate subsidies on mortgages were instituted in 1968 for 
the benefit of the Housing bank, CIH. In 1996, as a by-product of financial market liberalization, they were 
“de-specialized”, i.e., granted to households taking out loans form banks other than CIH. The cost of these 
subsidies grew from about US $10 million in the early 1990s to US $50 million in 2003.  In 2004, the 
Finance Law discontinued the subsidy. However, all previously approved loans continued to benefit from 
the subsidies, and subsidy payments should decrease only slowly and continue at least until the year 2015.   17
Evaluating the Criteria in Practice 
 
Based on the above discussion, it should be clear that some criteria are not easily identified 
through quantitative indicators, except at times on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, some criteria 
have multiple dimensions, and various indicators may be required to identify a particular 
criterion. Moreover, even when quantitative indicators come to mind, as in the case of efficiency, 
their practical computation may be complicated, and as such, not easily available. Thus, in most 
cases, qualitative or semi-quantitative information summarizing program performance under 
specific criteria must be identified. 
 
Once adequate data have been collected, the programs are given ratings according to a predefined 
scale for each criterion. In this paper, we have arbitrarily chosen to rate the programs from 1 to 5. 
A program that performs poorly will receive a score of 1, while a program which performs well 
will be rated 5. We agree that any assessment of policies or programs according to the suggested 
criteria is highly subjective, and is therefore subject to criticism. However, casual practice 
suggests at least two reasons why such a system would be better than it appears: 
 
•  Whether a particular program receives a score of “3” or a “4” in a particular dimension 
should be of little importance. The point is that housing specialists who examine the same 
type of program applied in different cities or countries should agree on the relative 
ranking of those programs according to the five or six criteria. The same applies to the 
comparison of two different types of programs in the same city or country. In other 
words, the cardinal properties of such a system are irrelevant, and it is the ordinal 
properties that matter. 
 
•  On second thought, even cardinal ranking my not be such a problem. In certain cases, 
once experts reach consensus on a ranking of programs in a particular dimension, 
reference to qualitative and/or quantitative indicators can be used to apply cardinal values 
to programs under this scale. This is why it is important to identify reasonable indicators 
for each criterion. 
 
Practical difficulties and means to compensate for the lack of quantitative information can be best 
illustrated through examples. Some of these are described in the companion paper which uses this 
framework for Morocco. 
 
3) Aggregating Across Subsidy Types 
 
This section presents the method used to aggregate ratings for different programs based on the 
criteria defined in the previous section. The objective of this exercise is to find a synthetic tool for 
comparing housing subsidies systems across countries. Without such a tool, such a comparison 
can be a difficult exercise, essentially because: 
 
•  Variations in the parameters for a given subsidy type seem to vary almost ad infinitum 
across countries. 
•  Not all countries choose every type of housing subsidy. 
•  The mix of effective housing programs (i.e., their relative importance in terms of 
financial weight) is country and time-specific. 
 
Suppose previous work in two different countries (or in the same country at two different times) 
have produced tables listing the different programs of housing subsidies and giving different   18
scores for each criterion defined in the previous section. To compare the two subsidy systems, 
one needs a way to aggregate the scores of all the subsidies along each criterion. The simplest 
idea is to compute a score for the whole subsidy system as a weighted average of the scores of 
each program.  
 
Mathematically speaking, if there are n types of subsidies, and ( ) n i i S ,.., 1 =  are the scores of the n 
subsidies based on a particular criterion, we want to find n weights ( ) n i i w ,.., 1 = so that the score of 

























The problem is then to find a meaningful weighting system, i.e., to assign a weight to each type of 
subsidy. The solution we propose consists of weighting the programs by expenditures (explicit or 
implicit) on those programs, or, which is the same, by the shares of the programs in total 
expenditures on housing subsidies. This choice seems by far the most natural. It is also a practical 
one, in the sense that alternative information on the whole subsidy system for weighting the 
program scores may not be available in practice. Having a reliable way to measure of the amount 
of all subsidies is already challenging. The way to effectively compute “expenditures” for various 
types of subsidies is described in the section below. 
 
Before doing so, however, one must first assess the meaning of aggregation for the various 
criteria defined above. Three questions arise:  
•  Do aggregate scores on particular criteria have a sense? i.e., is it possible, based on 
individual assessments under a particular criterion, to obtain an aggregated measure for 
the whole subsidy system? 
•  If this is not the case, can the criterion at the aggregate level be given a meaning sense 
somewhat close to its sense at the individual level, and how should the system be 
evaluated based on this new criterion? 
•  Could supplementary criteria be relevant at the aggregate level, and not at the individual 
level? 
 
In the case of the first question, we can define three levels of “goodness of aggregation”: 
satisfactory, limited, and poor.
29 Results are summarized in Table 2. Targeting, vertical equity, 
visibility, transparency, flexibility and incentives make the cut easily. The case of administrative 
simplicity is not so clear, because hundreds of simple subsidies can prove complex for the 
administration and the taxpayer. Apart from this caveat, aggregating should not be a problem 
under this criterion. 
 
                                                 
29 We take the practitioner’s point of view, rather than the economist’s point of view, because the 
economist could be tempted to call any attempt of aggregation across subsidy types a nonsense.   19
Table 2 : Meaning of Aggregation of Scores across Subsidy Types 
 
Criterion  Meaning of Aggregation across Subsidy Types 
Administrative 
simplicity 
Limited. Hundreds of simple subsidies can create a complex system for 




Poor. Partial coverage by complementary measures may result in good 




Efficiency  Poor. Multiple distortions are difficult to model and can result in welfare 
effects contrary to common sense.  







Three criteria have different meanings at the aggregate level: sustainability, coverage, and 
efficiency. An aggregation of individual sustainability measures appears no worse than the 
individual measures themselves. Indeed, sustainability is better defined at an aggregate level than 
at the individual program level, since the whole mass of housing subsidies can be followed 
through time and compared to other macroeconomic indicators. As for coverage, aggregation 
clearly fails, since partial coverage by complementary measures may result in good overall 
coverage of the poor. On the contrary, accounting for these complementarities is particularly 
important in the design of subsidy systems. As for efficiency, it is well known that distortions of 
multiple markets are difficult to model and can result in welfare effects which defy common 
sense. Thus caution is needed in the assessment of efficiency at an aggregate level.  
 
Lastly, an important criterion relevant only at the aggregate level, may be that of redundancy or 
competition between programs. In most countries, changes in the tax and benefit systems often 
occur incrementally. New provisions are included in the existing system, whereas previous 
programs are not necessarily dropped. As a result, the portion of the tax and benefits systems 
which concerns housing often presents layers of programs and provisions which are not always 
consistent. One example is when housing construction is both taxed and subsidized.
30 Although 
the quantitative effects of multiple distortions are difficult to estimate, it seems clear in practice 
that subsidizing and taxing construction at the same time cannot be optimal, and will result in 
both distorted supply and waste of resources. Thus, evaluation of the subsidy system based on 
this criterion should focus on the logic of the subsidy system as a whole,  merging various 
subsidies , and on the way the different programs interact and complement each other.  
 
Table 3 summarizes the differences between the program and aggregate levels for the list of 
criteria. 
 
                                                 
30 Once again, Morocco is a good example of this. On the one hand, housing production is taxed through a 
tax on cement. On the other hand, production of housing and social housing in particular is heavily 
subsidized via tax cuts and exemptions.   20
Table 3 : Correspondence between criteria at individual and aggregate levels  
 
Criteria having the same 
meaning at individual and 
aggregate levels 
Criteria having different 
meanings at individual and 
aggregate levels 
Criteria only relevant at 
aggregate level 
 
Administrative simplicity*  Coverage/horizontal equity  Redundancy / competition 
Targeting Efficiency   
Vertical equity (redistribution)  Sustainability   
Visibility    
Transparency    
Flexibility    
Incentives    
* : with a caveat, see Table 2. 
 
 
How to measure expenditures on housing subsidies? 
 
Measuring expenditures for housing subsidies can vary between very easy (case of subsidies on 
budget), to very difficult (case of non-priced in-kind or implicit subsidies). Thus, rather than a 
presenting a general method, we prefer to give some concrete examples. 
  
•  Subsidies on budget: expenditures on those subsidies should be forecast, allocated and 
monitored and they should be easily obtainable. 
 
•  Subsidies through tax code provisions:  Measuring the implicit expenditure in this case is 
not straightforward. An accurate measure would need to rely on models incorporating the 
whole tax (and benefit, in the case of the household) system, to account for behavioral 
responses of agents to changes in the tax system. As a rule, those responses do matter in 
determining the magnitude of the changes in tax revenues. However, this approach is 
rarely used because it is both time and data-consuming. Within administrations, 
simulations and estimations often rely on the so-called “tax expenditure” method.
31 This 
very simple method is purely static and consists in applying the tax rebate / change to the 
existing tax base. Estimates obtained in this way neglect the response of agents to the 
change and, thus, tend to overestimate the loss of tax revenues for the government. 
Another weakness in this approach is that agreement has to be reached on what the 
“normal” level of taxes
32 should be. This is not always obvious. Although controversial, 
this simple method is very often the only one available. Since it usually gives at least 
correct orders of magnitude, it should be used when more detailed estimations are not 
available. 
  
•  Land subsidies. Very often land is given or sold at below market price to producers or 
directly to households. In this case, the amount of subsidy should be computed from 
evaluating a market price for the land, from which the price paid by beneficiaries will be 
deducted. Interestingly, in some countries the size of those subsidies is not computed by 
                                                 
31 This method is officially used by Canada and the United States,  among others, who annually compute  
estimations of fiscal expenditures in an appendix to the federal budget. The concept of fiscal expenditure 
has received much criticism in those countries. 
32 For example, the case of capital gains on real estate. Should the “base” tax rate on capital gains be  
applied to interest income, to wage income, or to dividends?    21
the government, because state-owned land is perceived as a “free” resource, at least in the 
short run. The issue one may face here is that so much land is publicly held and allocated 
that it is not clear what the “market” price should be. 
 
•  Direct subsidies through housing finance instruments. Frequently, instruments of housing 
finance such as Housing Contract Savings Schemes (HCSS) serve as vehicles for housing 
subsidies, or have been subsidized to ensure their success.
33 This paper is not directly 
concerned with housing finance; however, the subsidies or premiums given to households 
should be included in the total amount of housing subsidies. The availability of figures in 
that case will vary by the type of instrument, but can be expected to be high, since those 
subsidies are typically budgeted. 
 
•  Indirect subsidies through finance instruments. This includes the value of State 
commitments on instruments such as mortgage insurance schemes, liquidity facilities, 
hedging instruments for mortgage lenders, etc. Pricing those products (which in the case 
of guarantee schemes amounts to estimating the contingent liabilities faced by the State) 
is possible in theory, and is effectively done under private schemes. Historically, 
however, this type of instrument is initially introduced by the State, and subsequently 
taken over by the private sector. At the beginning of the system, calculation may not be 
available due to lack of adequate historical data. An example of how data on mortgages 
can be used to estimate the cost of a subsidy program in the form of low-LTV mortgages 
at subsidized rates is given in Deng et al. (1996). 
 
4) Limits of the Method 
 
The usual limits applying to economic analysis of particular programs, independently of the rest 
of the economy, also affect the analysis of housing subsidies. Interventions or distortions, 
operating both inside and outside the housing market, can influence the efficiency of subsidy 
programs as well as the entire housing subsidy system.
34 
 
An example of internal distortion is rent control. Whether rent control should be considered as a 
subsidy is not clear on a priori basis, and depends on the exact nature of the control involved. 
However, modeling and estimation of economic and welfare effects of rent control share many 
characteristics with the evaluation of other types of subsidies (Fallis and Smith 84, 85, Heffley, 
1997, Basu and Emerson, 2000, 2002). Of importance also in the rental sector is the legal 
framework defining the rights and duties of landlords and tenants. Based on the balance between 
landlords and tenants, it can encourage or hinder the development of the rental market. 
Subsidizing the rental market in the latter case can be totally inefficient. 
 
Examples of external distortions concern land titling / security of tenure issues (for case studies, 
see Payne, 2002; for an early paper, see Friedman, Jimenez and Mayo, 1988) as well as in land 
planning and zoning regulatory frameworks. Inefficiencies arising from inadequate laws or 
regulations in those areas can largely offset the effects of all public subsidies on housing. This 
problem has been recognized by economists, both on the theoretical side (Arnott and McKinnon, 
1977, Bertaud and Brueckner, 2003) and on the empirical side (Brueckner, 1996, Fu and 
Somerville, 2001). 
 
                                                 
33 For a description of HCSS systems, see Lea and Renaud (1995).  
34 Acknowledgment of this has led to increased focus of multilateral agencies on legal and regulatory issues 
in the housing sector. See World Bank (1993).   22
In conclusion, it is worth noting that while the traditional public finance criteria used here help 
evaluate traditional government interventions in the primary housing markets, they may fall short 
of providing a satisfactory assessment of the benefits and costs of government interventions 
through  implementation of, or participation in, housing finance instruments such as secondary 
market agencies, mortgage insurance schemes, etc. Inasmuch as these instruments benefit from 
specific regulatory advantages or explicit financing by the state, as is very often the case, there 
are subsidies involved, and a complete picture of a government commitment in the housing sector 
should account for them. However, traditional public finance criteria are mostly concerned with 
efficient allocation of resources, whereas housing finance instruments mainly deal with efficient 
allocation of risks. Hence, in some cases, applying the criteria used here to the part of the subsidy 
system which concerns complex housing finance instruments may prove both difficult and 
incomplete.
35 As financial markets develop around the world, it is to be expected that a growing 
portion of Government interventions in the housing sector will relate to housing finance. The type 
of analysis described in this paper will therefore become less relevant as the bulk of subsidies 
shifts from primary to secondary market interventions. However, in many developing countries, 
affordability problems remain the main concern and financial markets are just starting to develop, 
so that “traditional” housing subsidies will remain the main vehicle of state intervention for years 
to come. Rationalizing housing subsidies, by using scarce public resources more efficiently, is 
still a high priority objective. 
 
                                                 
35 For example, how are we to judge the efficiency of a government mortgage insurance scheme?   23
Part II : Application to Morocco 
 
We now apply the methodology developed in Part I to assess the performance of the housing 
subsidy system in Morocco. We have used data from a study undertaken by the Ministry of 
Housing in Morocco in 1998-1999, through an assistance program of the World Bank 
(PLURAM-ALGOE-PROMOCONSULT, 1999). The purpose of the study was to examine all the 
dimensions of housing financing in Morocco. In particular, it looked at all subsidies for housing, 
both from a qualitative and quantitative perspective.  One product of the study is a booklet which 
summarizes expenditures on all types of housing subsidies in Morocco, explicit as well as 
implicit, for the year 1995. We have used this and other materials
36 to rate the different 
components of the housing subsidy system based on public finance criteria described in Part I. 
 




Morocco has a current population of about 30 million people and 5 million primary residences. In 
2000, 62% of households were owners, 28 % were renters, and 10 % had another status.
37 
Similar to its neighbors, Algeria and Tunisia, Morocco faces a high urban population growth, 
with an annual growth rate ranging from 3 to 4 %. Demand for new housing units is estimated at 
about 120,000 units per year and is expected to continue growing in future due to the 
demographic composition of the population, whereas annual supply of formal housing units is 
estimated around 90,000 units. 
 
The housing stock can be broken down into two categories: formal and informal. Here, “formal” 
conforms to the law. Concretely, a formal housing unit is built on a properly titled land, in an area 
zoned for residential construction (see below), and has a legal construction permit. The formal 
housing stock is estimated at 80% of the total stock.  Informal housing can be in turn broken 
down into two categories: illegal but in good condition (called “habitat non réglementaire”, 15 % 
of the stock), and slums (barracks and shacks, 5% of the stock). Habitat non réglementaire 
represents units which, at any given stage of the production process, did not comply with laws 
and regulations. The main consequence of this was a lack of basic services and utilities, since by 
law, illegal units install utilities.  
 
During the past 20 years, informal housing has developed at a faster pace than formal housing in 
spite of government intervention (see below). Construction of Habitat non réglementaire can be 
attributed to bottlenecks stemming from the land titling system, on the one hand, and zoning and 
planning procedures at all geographical levels, on the other.  
 
- Land  titling: As many former colonies, Morocco faces the coexistence of many types of 
property rights for land. Public land, i.e., land owned by the state, still represents a large 
portion of the country.  Most property rights for private land stem from the Ottoman 
(customary) system: This system recognizes both individual property rights and 
community rights on land parcels. At present, the bequest of land to communities results 
in uncertainty of property rights and immobilization of land with urban potential. 
                                                 
36 In particular, another study undertaken in the same conditions as the first, the study by EDESHA-
URBAPLAN-IHEM (1998), concentrated on the bottlenecks in the housing construction process. 
37 The rental sector is entirely private, except for 38,000 public units managed by the companies CIFM and 
SOPHAL.   24
However, the only "official" titles for land (and the only ones that allow for 
collateralization) are those of the Torrens type. The applicable law was passed in 1913 
and has not been amended since. The formal procedure to obtain a title is both lengthy 
and costly
38, and is subject to court settlement of disputes, which generates delays and 
backlogs in the titling process. As a result, it is estimated that only 12 % of the country 
was titled in 2004 (20% in urban areas). 
 
- Urban  planning. The urban zoning and planning system is very restrictive. It includes  
compulsory production of master plans for cities and more detailed plans for lower 
geographical levels. Construction projects located outside of planned zones are forbidden 
and cannot obtain permits. The master plans are valid for ten years and in theory cannot 
be amended during that time. Moreover, it has been frequently mentioned  that, due to the 
long delays in production and approval, the plans become outdated by the time they are 
approved. 
 
- Building  permits are expensive, time-consuming to obtain, and subject to having  an 
official title or deed for the property. 
 
The bottlenecks described above produce a thin market for urban land, high land prices, and long 
delays between project conception and delivery of housing units (in 1995 it was estimated that 
land was held by developers for 9 years on average), which result in expensive new formal 
housing and basically encourages illegal construction. A 60m
2 dwelling was estimated to cost 
between MDH 210,000 and 290,000 in the two main cities, and between MDH 150,000 and 
170,000 in other large towns. 
                                                 
38 When the procedure runs smoothly, it can take more than one year on average. However, many cases go 
to court. In those instances, it is not rare to see cases still unsettled after 5, 10, or even over 20 years.   25
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Figures 2 and 3 show that affordability of housing was the main problem in Morocco in 1995. 
Median monthly income (as measured by expenditures) stood at about MDH 4,000, 
approximately equivalent to US$ 400. Taking into account conditions prevailing in the mortgage 
market at that time (favorable conditions would be a LTV of not more than 75 %, maximum 
payment-to-income ratio of 30 %, and a mortgage interest rate of 11.5 %), it is clear that new 
construction in urban centers was totally inaccessible to those within the lower half of the income 
distribution. 
 
Apart from affordability problems, access to housing credit was limited by the following: 
 
-  Lack of interest on the part of the banking system in the lower deciles of income. Banks 
are mainly interested in clients with stable sources of income, which is most often 
contingent upon having steady employment. But only 58% of the labor force in 1995 
worked in the formal sector, of which 22% in the public sector. Wage earners were 
concentrated in the higher parts of the income distribution, so that a majority of 
households located in the lower half were not considered as good clients by the banks. In 
fact, very few people even had a bank account. 
 
-  Unfair competition on the mortgage market by the State Housing Bank, CIH, which 
prevented banks from participating (see below). 
 
As a result, more than 50 % of new construction was self-construction. Moroccan households 
typically construct their homes one floor at a time, without recourse to housing finance. Housing 
loans represented only 5% of GDP in 1995, which shows the very limited outreach of mortgage 
financing at that time. Mortgages distributed by the CIH and other banks were of the FRM type, 
with constant repayments. The typical duration of a loan was 15 years. In theory, interest rates 
were market-based, though the quasi-monopoly of the CIH enabled it to maintain high margins. 
 
2) Housing subsidies in Morocco in 1995 
 
This section is devoted to the presentation of the housing subsidy system prevailing in Morocco 
in 1995. First is presented an outline of the organization of housing construction. Second, we 
examine the tax system applying to housing production and consumption. Finally, details follow 
on housing subsidies. 
 
In 1995, the production of formal housing was characterized by the broad spectrum of State 
intervention: 
-  control of the majority of land servicing and construction of low-cost housing units (apart 
from self-construction); 
-  subsidies to State construction companies in the form of land parcels from the public 
domain; 
-  programs of slum upgrading and prevention, financed from the investment budget of the 
Ministry of Housing;  
-  existence of a State housing bank, CIH, which benefited exclusively from demand-side 
subsidies through subsidized interest rates on mortgages and other benefits;
39 and 
-  other important subsidies to producers in the form of tax breaks (see below). 
                                                 
39 Including the right to issue bonds guaranteed by the State, and access to a faster foreclosure procedure. 
The former privilege was suppressed in 1993 after the reform of the financial sector.   27
 
 
Figure 4 : Simplified Organization of the Housing Production Sector in Morocco – 1995 
 
 
The State controlled a large portion of the land servicing process through parastatal companies 
called Producteurs Publics de l’Habitat (PPHs).
40 These companies were supervised financially 
by the Ministry of Finance, but for operational purposes depended on the ministry of Housing. 
The Ministry of Housing used the PPHs as implementing agencies for the State programs of 
slums eradication and prevention. As such, the PPHs benefited from transfers of State public 
land, given or sold at very low prices. This represented an important subsidy to these 
                                                 
40 Producteurs Publics de l’Habitat. These State companies included ANHI, SNEC, Attacharouk, and seven 


























































41 Another typical feature of PPH interventions was that they were not limited to the 
production of serviced lots or to the construction of low-cost housing for low-income households. 
Instead, the concept of cross-subsidization (called péréquation in French) was at the heart of the 
State strategy. This consisted of producing different types of land plots or housing units in any 
development project (that is, low, medium and high standard plots or housing units).  Medium 
and high standard units were then sold for more than production cost, in order to further subsidize 
units and lots for low-income beneficiaries. Therefore, in practice, State subsidies from gifts of 
public land were not targeted to low-income households. 
 
This cross-subsidy mechanism was possible because of the large subsidy implied by the transfer 
of public land, so that even after cross-subsidizing low-income units, the price of medium and 
high-level units remained below the price attainable by private developers who had to carry the 
full cost of land servicing. As a result of unfair competition, private developers were crowded out 
of most the land servicing and construction business. They were forced to concentrate on niches, 
which consisted in construction of upscale units, in the country’s two largest cities, Casablanca 
and Rabat-Salé, where the reserves of public land had already begun to dry up.  
 
The main demand-side housing subsidy was in the form of subsidized interest rates on mortgages. 
These subsidies were created by a Royal Decree of 1968,. Two subsidy regimes were created 
based on the estimated value of units built. For the highest bracket of unit values (régime 
général), the interest rate subsidy was 2% for the life of the loan. For the lowest bracket of unit 
values (régime special), the subsidy was a rebate of 6% on the interest rate.  However, in spite of 
a reform of the banking sector in 1993, CIH was still the only bank benefiting from these 
subsidies in 1995. As a result of generous interest rate discounts, other banks could not enter the 
market, especially for low-value units. Their role thus remained limited, and the market share of 
CIH in the mortgage lending business was over 50%.
42 
 
Table 4 synthesizes the revenues and expenditures from the tax and subsidy system applying to 
housing in 1995.  For the sake of simplicity, some lines in Table 4 refer to groups of provisions in 
the tax code, rather than to the provisions themselves. However, tax revenues from housing 
construction are distinguished from tax revenues from the housing stock, as commonly done from 
a fiscal analysis perspective. 
 
Housing production was taxed in the form of corporate taxes, income taxes (for rental income), 
VAT, capital gains on housing, titling fees and duty, and construction taxes (a local tax). Existing 
units were taxed on income tax, capital gains, solidarity tax, titling fees and duty. The housing 
stock was also subject to three local taxes which represent the bulk of the municipalities’ own 




                                                 
41 Regarding competition with private developers, the PPHs also benefited also from financial benefits 
(zero-interest loans form the State, ability to collect payments from beneficiary households on units not yet 
built, and from the ease to obtain administrative approvals and permits). 
42 CIH also had privileged links with the PPH, being a quasi –exclusive lender to the parastatals. The 
combined debts of parastatals to the CIH eventually became a serious threat for the financial health of CIH. 
43 In official terminology, the Taxe Urbaine is not a local tax. However, both the Taxe Urbaine and the 
Taxe d’édilité share the same base, i.e., both are collected by the central State administration, and both are 
returned to municipalities, except for 10% kept by the State as a collection fee.   29
In 1995, revenues generated by construction of housing units amounted to MDH 2,200 million, 
whereas revenues from taxes on existing units amounted to MDH 4,259 million. It is apparent 
that housing construction is highly taxed in comparison to existing units. 
 





Flows Stocks Total 
Corporate Tax 
Income Tax – Rental income 
Income Tax – Deductibility of mortgage interests 
VAT 




























Total 1869  1786  3655 












Total 0  2438  2438 
Tax on vacant land 
Tax on land division operations 
Tax on “lotissement”  
Construction Tax 
















Total 331  25  356 
Grand Total  2200  4249  6449 
Source : Etude PLURAM INTERNATIONAL-ALGOE-PROMOCONSULT, Ministry of Housing, Morocco (1999), 
except numbers with a *:  Source, World Bank. 
 
 
Table 5 presents subsidy breakdowns for the housing sector through tax cuts, direct subsidies, and 
land subsidies to producers, with the relevant estimated expenditures. Although the general 
principles underlying the PLURAM-ALGOE-PROMOCONSULT study to calculate expenditures 
on subsidies are consistent with those mentioned above, the exact methods used vary from one 
subsidy to another.
44 As underlined in the previous chapter, estimating tax expenditures requires 
consensus on the definition of “normal” tax levels.  
                                                 
44 The evaluations rely primarily on common sense, rather than technically involved mathematics. Most 
evaluations involve no more than a “proportion rule”, the difficulty being to locate reliable  information to 
assess the quantity to be estimated.   30
Table 5 : Housing Subsidies in Morocco – Detailed List and Amounts as of 1995 
 




Fiscal Expenditures    
Registration  Fees  Reduced rate : 2.5% instead of 5% for dwellings with 
value under Dh 350,000 
 
  Reduced rate : 1.25% instead of 5% for dwellings with 
value under Dh 180,000 
(total)     
458* 
VAT  Reduced VAT rate for housing sector (14% instead of 
20%)  
824 
  No VAT on self-construction  222 
  No VAT on social housing (area < 100 m2 and value , 
200,000 DH) 
44 
  Exemption of VAT on interests for mortgages  63 
Income Tax  Deduction of mortgage interests from taxable income  276* 
  Deduction of 40 % from rental income  n.a. 
  Deduction of mortgage interests and capital from taxable 
income, for wage earners buying social dwellings (Value 
< MDH 500,000)  
n.a. 
Tax  on  Capital  Gains  Total exemption after 10 years possession, partial 
exemption after 5 years possession 
570* 
  Exemption of the first sale of social unit (area < 100 m2 
and value , 200,000 DH) 
n.a. 
Taxe Urbaine  Tax base cut by 75 % for homeowners  275 
  Exemption for new units for the first 5 years  100 
  Exemption for social housing for all the duration of the 
loan  
5 
Taxe d’édilité  Tax base cut by 75 % for homeowners  992 
Construction Tax  Exemption for social units built on parcels with area <100 
m2 
13 
Total   3842 
Direct Subsidies    
Housing Ministry 
Investment Budget 
Investment expenditures for slum upgrading and 
infrastructure servicing of the informal sector programs 
144 
Interest rate subsidies on 
mortgages 
Applies to households buying dwellings from the Housing 
Bank (CIH) for less than MDH. 500,000 
181 
Exchange rate risks  Treasury covers the exchange rate risk on loans serving to 
finance social housing programs 
20 
Total   345 
Land subsidies  Provision of land parcels from the State domain to public 
developers for construction of social housing, at prices 
below market 
637 
Grand Total    4824 
Source : Etude PLURAM INTERNATIONAL-ALGOE-PROMOCONSULT, Ministry of Housing, Morocco (1999),  
except for items with a * : Author’s calculations from World Bank (1995). n.a. : not available. 
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Supply-Driven Subsidies: 
 
Land Subsidies for State-Owned Companies. 
 
As mentioned above, this corresponds to public land given or sold at below-market prices to State 
companies (the PPH). The amount of these subsidies was estimated at MDH 636 million in 1995. 
Due to the discretionary nature of land transfers to the PPH, this subsidy was not transparent. The 
illusion of "free" land implied that the amount of these subsidies was not computed by the State. 
Transparency was again very low. This type of subsidy, similar to a manna for the PPH, did not 
generate incentives to lower costs or to produce housing units meeting the market demand. 
 
The subsidy was also badly targeted, both from a spatial point of view and from a redistribution 
perspective. From a spatial point of view, it has been noted above that reserves of public land, 
while still abundant around small cities, were already greatly reduced around Rabat-Salé and 
Casablanca, where demand was the highest, creating a problem of sustainability for this type of 
subsidy. Thus, the PPH had an incentive to construct most in places where the demand for their 
product was lowest. The result of this disconnect between supply and demand was the servicing 
of land parcels and construction of housing units in remote areas, which made them difficult to 
sell and eventually constrained the PPH to sell them below cost. This problem has persisted until 
now. From a redistribution point of view, the péréquation system of cross-subsidies described 
above resulted in a waste of land given away by the State, since for any given number of low-cost 
units built for low-income households, two or three times as many medium or high-end units had 
to be constructed and sold to medium or high-income households. The PLURAM-ALGOE-
PROMOCONSULT estimated that only MDH 150 million of the land subsidies (24%) effectively 
reached households in the three lowest deciles of the income distribution, through serviced land 
parcels. 
 
This type of subsidy was not efficient. As noted above, disconnects between supply and demand 
were exacerbated by the lack of reserves of public land in areas where housing demand was the 
highest. There exists no study on the efficiency of the PPH as producers of housing units, making 
it difficult to assess which portion of land subsidies were merely captured instead of being 
transferred to consumers. However, an indirect efficiency indicator is given by the performance 
of the PPH. Is spite of benefiting from large subsidies, some PPHs were heavily indebted, and 
had to rely on yearly subsidies by Ministry of Housing to balance current operating costs.Also 
important was the unfair competition subsidies created for private developers who could not 
benefit from them. As mentioned above, this deterred the creation of a strong private construction 
industry, and thus led to monopoly and housing shortage. 
 
 
Direct Investment by the Ministry of Housing via the PPH 
 
This type of investment comprised all programs managed by the Ministry of Housing using its 
own budget, which amounted to MDH 144 million in 1995. This included slum upgrading 
programs in a broad sense, including: Recasement (giving former slum dwellers serviced land 
plots on which they can build their homes), relogement (moving former slum dwellers into 
finished housing units), and prévention (building housing units aimed at providing low-income 
households an alternative to informal solutions). These programs have been characterized by a 
mix of construction styles, with cross-subsidization of land plots and housing units aimed at low-
income households for other types of units. 
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The implementation of the projects was done by the PPH, under supervision from the Ministry of 
Housing. No specific evaluation of the administrative simplicity is known. However, the 
responsible unit within the ministry of Housing consisted in an administrative, project-by-project, 
follow-up. At the beginning of the 1990s, a computer database was developed at the Ministry of 
Housing which included all project records. However, no permanent evaluation and monitoring 
framework existed. 
 
As often, slum upgrading projects generated incentives for households which affected the 
program efficiency. First, the government’s public commitment to dealing with slums gave 
households an incentive to migrate to slums, in the hope of finding cheap housing in future. 
Locally, when a State program was initiated in a particular slum area, the resident population 
would suddenly increase, which made budget and physical forecasts obsolete. Furthermore, 
households granted relogement units had strong incentives to sell them immediately and return to 
living in the slums. Frequently, relogement and recasement operations were not accompanied by 
sufficiently rigid measures to prevent redevelopment of the vacated slums. In this regard, lack of 
coordination with municipalities whose responsibilities were not clearly defined, became a 
definite problem. Local governments had no incentives to eradicate slums because these were 
seen as a trigger for State intervention measures, resulting in construction of housing units in their 
jurisdictions through national budget financing. 
 
Efficiency was also low. A study by the Ministry of Housing on the projects managed by the PPH 
from 1983 to 1995 revealed the following: projects included distribution of serviced land plots 
(recasement) and completed housing units (relogement). Although 80% of the land plots had been 
distributed to beneficiaries before 1987 and 96% before 1990, 29% of the parcels were not 
constructed in 1997, and only 46% included completed and occupied dwellings. The population 
living in the parcels represented only 30% of initial program projections. In the case of 
relogement programs, the rate of completion was higher (80% of the projected housing units had 
been constructed) and vacancy rates were lower, but the units housed only 70% of the projected 
population. From the social point of view, evaluation studies undertaken by the Ministry of 
housing showed that the programs were focused on the physical dimension, and failed to take into 
account potential problems which might arise from relocation of former slum dwellers into new 
neighborhoods. Loss of a social network, lack of services in the newly urbanized zones, and lack 
of public transport networks were quoted as the most pervasive problems for the newly relocated 
families.  
 
The programs were also badly targeted because of the péréquation system of cross-subsidization 
mentioned above, under which the bulk of government spending on those programs eventually 
benefit medium and high-income households. From a horizontal equity point of view, the 
programs gave preferential treatment to households living in slums, de facto encouraging the 
development of informal housing. 
 
The two other main issues were coverage and sustainability. Spatial coverage was problematic 
because of the land availability issues in some cities, as described above. Sustainability issues 
also arose because the investment budget of the Ministry of Housing was subject to arbitrage each 
year, and appeared insufficient to seriously address the issue of informal housing development. 
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Demand subsidies 
 
Interest Rate Subsidies on Mortgages Distributed by the Housing Bank. 
 
As noted above, this corresponded to interest rate subsidies on mortgages distributed by the CIH. 
The amount of the subsidy was 2 points of interest for mortgages taken out on dwellings valued at 
less than MDH 350,000 (régime général), and 6 points for mortgages taken out on dwellings 
valued at less than MDH 200,000 (régime spécial). All loans issued by the CIH for the 
construction of units valued at under MDH 500,000 were also exempt from VAT on loan interests 
(at a rate if 7%)
45. In 1992, expenditures amounted to MDH 50 million under the régime general, 
and MDH 130 million under the régime special. 
 
Although these subsidies were transparent and commercially simple to explain to buyers, they 
were not simple to manage because the State was obliged to keep track of every single loan and 
reimburse the CIH annually on the basis of the loan interest rates which varied. A special unit in 
the Treasury managed this system. On the incentive side, however, the existence of thresholds  
for eligibility under the régime général and régime special created strong incentives for 
developers to understate the value of the units in order to fall into advantageous brackets. As the 




For the reasons mentioned above, interest rate subsidies were not adequately covering 
homebuyers, nor were they well-targeted. Moreover, since these subsidies were aimed at formal 
housing mortgage owners, they neglected those in the lower brackets of the income distribution.
47 
A World Bank Study in 1995 based on documents from CIH showed that 80% of beneficiaries of 
régime spécial loans declared annual incomes above MDH 60,000, which corresponds to deciles 
6 and above in the income distribution scale. Subsidies under régime spécial loans appeared 
better targeted, all of them targeting the poorest 40% of the population. 
 
In the context of fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) with fixed repayments applied in Morocco, 
affordability problems would arise at the beginning of the mortgage repayment period, either 
because of constraints on the maximum LTV (insufficient savings), or because payments were 
too high. In time, fixed nominal payments translate into decreasing real payments due to inflation; 
also, real incomes can increase. Thus, subsidies are needed mainly at the beginning of the loan. 
Instead, the interest rate subsidy as parameterized in Morocco would apply for the entire life of 
the loan, which is clearly inefficient. Moreover, under this scenario, the value of the régime 
spécial subsidy was very high, equivalent to about 40% of the mortgage value.. Combined with 
other types of subsidies, this resulted in huge subsidies for few fortunate households able to 
obtain a mortgage. Lastly, this resulted in very high inertia of the system, in the sense that loans 
approved at any given time would continue to generate liabilities for the State for the next 15 
years and thus, flexibility was very low. 
 
As noted above, the main problem facing subsidies at that time was that they were granted only to 
CIH, de facto, excluding other banks from competing in the mortgage market. However, the 
                                                 
45 This tax seems to exist only in Morocco. 
46 This was amplified by the fact that the concept of value used for administrative purposes, the VIT, was 
based on administratively pre-set values for land, and on construction costs for dwellings, resulting in 
differences between the VIT and market value of the dwellings. 
47 The subsidy also had a built-in regressive feature (within each bracket, the higher the unit value, the 
higher the subsidy).   34
generous nature of these subsidies, especially under the régime spécial, was only applicable to a 
small number of loans. Thus, from the very beginning, sustainability problems were likely to 
occur given these interest rate parameters.  
 
Subsidies through provisions in the Tax code 
 
-  Deductions of mortgage interest payments from taxable income:  up to 10% of taxable 
income. The corresponding expenditure amounted to MDH 276 million in 1995. A World 
Bank study on CIH data from 1992 (World Bank, 1995) showed that the tax expenditure 
for CIH loans only was Mdh 115 million, out of MDH 277 million of deductible 
interests. This corresponded to an average subsidy rate of 41% on mortgage interests. The 
subsidy rate, corresponding to the marginal tax rate, was increasing in income. 
Households with income above MDH 60,000 per year (the highest three deciles of the 
income distribution), which represented 62% of the CIH mortgagers in 1992, benefited 
from 68% of the tax expenditure. Thus, the provision was highly regressive. 
 
-  For civil servants, the ability to deduct payments from the mortgage principal and interest 
from taxable income, without a ceiling, provided the dwelling is worth less than MDH 
500,000. The cost of this provision is not known for 1995. However, this provision, 
which still applies today, is particularly inequitable, since it benefits only a specific 
household category, which is on average wealthier than most, and thus has easy access to 
funds because of their job security.  
 
The combination of these two provisions was thus poorly targeted, with a redistribution pattern 
favoring the wealthy over those benefiting from interest rates subsidies. This pattern also suffered 
from the same coverage problems (only households to access housing finance covered), 
exacerbated by the income tax schedule, which resulted in the majority of interest rate subsidies  
being distributed to those in higher tax brackets.  
 
Although this type of subsidy exists in many countries, it can be highly inefficient (see Skinner, 
1996). In Morocco, another problem arises: when combined with interest rate subsidies, this 
scheme resulted in very low mortgages under the régime général, without any proven effect on 
housing supply, since most of the subsidy was distributed to segments of the population already 
served by the market. 
 
Sustainability of this type of subsidy is also limited. Tax expenditures remained relatively low as 
long as access to mortgage is limited, but would automatically increase relative to the overall 
mortgage debt in the country. Moreover, the corresponding revenue losses are drawn directly 
from income tax revenues, which represent one of the pillars of the tax system 
 
Regarding the other criteria, the administrative simplicity was very satisfactory (the subsidy is 
part of general income tax procedures), and transparency was also good. The procedure indirectly 
provided an incentive for filing tax returns, and was thus at the most neutral as concerns tax 
revenue generation for the State. Although flexibility was theoretically high, (a simple provision 
in the Finance Law for any given year could have suppressed this advantage), the provision was 
never seriously challenged, whereas others generated annual disagreements during the budget 
arbitrage process. This illustrates the low visibility of this measure. In contrast, sustainability of 
this type of subsidy was limited. Tax expenditures remained low as long as access to mortgages 
was limited, but would automatically increase according to the overall mortgage debt in the 
country. Moreover, the corresponding resources were drawn directly from income taxes.  
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-  Lower registration fees for housing. Registration is essential for accurately recording 
property titles, transactions, mortgages, rights of lease, etc. Most of the revenues are 
derived from transaction fees. The normal rate of 5% is reduced to 2.5% for all housing 
unit transactions by households. Moreover, for social units (valued at under MDH 
200,000 and an area below 100 m
2), the rate is further reduced to 1.25%. The 
corresponding fiscal expenditure was MDH 146 million in 1995.
48 
 
Lowering transaction fees is generally seen as a sound policy. It helps to stimulate housing 
transactions and evens out the real estate market by allowing households to adjust their housing 
stock more frequently. Notably, it reduces lock-in effects faced by recent buyers who cannot  
move due to the losses they would face and the difference between buying and selling prices of 
their dwellings. Moreover, from a standard point of view, the 5% rate which normally applies in 
Morocco may be considered too high. The lower fee for social units could represent yet another 
incentive for the construction of social units. However, whether or not this provision had any 
additional effect is yet to be seen, especially since it is the last of many exemptions for social 
units.  
 
However, this subsidy is fairly simple to manage, transparent and simple since it is built into the 
normal registration process. From the incentive point of view, this provision is also positive, since 
lower fees reduce the opportunity cost of formal registration, and thus may drive households into 
the formal housing sector.  This, in turn, could increase government revenues and is beneficial for 
the housing market. However, as in the case of other tax provisions, the lower unit rate is limited 
by a threshold value and thus provides incentives to decrease the reported the value of the unit.  
 
The distributional consequences of this policy are difficult to assess. It could be argued that 
mainly wealthy households will benefit from it, since they are more likely to own houses. 
However, overall welfare gains from a more balanced housing market, and which are likely to be 
given to more financially constrained households, may well offset this effect. 
 
Two other provisions of the tax system in 1995 could be considered as conveying indirect 
subsidies: 
 
-  Capital gains provisions.  
 
In 1995, housing capital gains were taxed separately from other income.
49 The rate of the 
corresponding tax, called TPI (Taxe sur les Profits Immobiliers), was 15%, compared to 20 or 
25% for other sources of income (interests and dividends). Capital gains were totally tax-exempt 
after 10 years of housing ownership, and partially tax-exempt after 5 years. Moreover, capital 
gains were subject to under-reporting, which generated a loss of revenue for the State. This 
comparison resulted in an estimated tax expenditure of MDH 570 million in 1995. 
 
Very few qualitative or quantitative details are available on this tax, but its effects can be briefly 
assessed: it was mainly targeted to average or high-income households who are more likely to 
own property of higher value and it encouraged under-reporting of real estate values. This tax 
                                                 
48 The calculation of the corresponding fiscal expenditure is purely conventional in this case, since the 
“reduced” rate of 2.5% for housing may as well be seen as the “normal” rate, since it applied to all housing 
transactions by individuals since 1958. In this case, only the revenue loss corresponding to social units 
should be counted as fiscal expenditure (MDH 13 million). However, for land transactions between 
individuals the rate is 5%. 
49 Since then, the TPI has been integrated into the income tax schedule.   36
also had very low visibility. Efficiency is low unless bequest motives are strong enough to 
effectively stimulate housing construction which is unlikely. However, due to this lack of 
information, the provision will not be rated. 
 
-  Deduction of 40% of rental income from taxable income.  
 
Deduction of a portion of rental income is traditionally permitted to account for charges and 
maintenance costs applying to housing investments. The real share of those costs determine 
whether rental housing is “better” treated than other non wage-based income such as interest 
income, which benefits from a source deduction of 25%. The difference, if it exists, could be 
considered as a tax expenditure. However, in the present case there is no way of assessing 
whether or not the deduction was too generous. This provision has thus been left out of our 
calculations. 
 
Local Tax Subsidies 
 
A peculiarity of the Moroccan system consists in the very different tax treatment of home owners 
compared to renters. Existing property is taxed in two ways: the first tax, the Taxe Urbaine, is a 
property tax stricto sensu. The tax base is the rental value of the house, determined from tax grids 
established at the local level and distinguishing a handful of house categories and neighborhoods. 
The tax rate is an increasing function of the rental value. The tax is paid by the owner of the 
property. However, occupying owners are taxed on a base diminished by 75% (and the rate 
corresponding to this lower base.
50. In addition, new units are exempt from the Taxe Urbaine 
during the first five years of ownership. 
 
The second tax, the Taxe d’Edilité, is a tax on urban services and is paid by the household 
occupying the dwelling. The tax rate is a flat 10%, whereas the tax base is the same as that of the 
Taxe Urbaine, including the 75% cut for owner-occupiers. 
 
The potential revenues lost from the base cut for owner-occupiers were the largest fiscal 
expenditure in 1995, representing nearly 30% of all subsidies. The 75% cut off the base for 
owners has been criticized for many reasons. First, it introduces a strong bias against rental 
housing as an investment, via the Taxe Urbaine. Second, renters pay four times as much as 
owners in terms of Taxe d’Edilité for similar housing units. However, this tax is levied in order to 
compensate for services offered locally to all residents, regardless of their status, and should thus 
be the same for renters and owners. Third, the effects of the provision for real estate investments 
have not been established. It should at the very least be indirect since housing construction alone 
is not affected. Moreover, since provisions affecting housing are different from other types of 
capital, this category of tax rebate could eventually result in higher housing prices through a 
capitalization effect. Comparisons drawn with other countries also suggest that effective tax rates 
on housing resulting from these tax cuts could leave the housing stock relatively untaxed 
compared  to construction of housing. 
 
However, the most problematic aspect of this provision in terms of efficiency concerns the local 
government revenues.  The Taxe Urbaine and Taxe d’édilité , along with the business tax, 
                                                 
50 For example, let us consider a dwelling whose rental value is estimated to be MDH 30,000. If the 
dwelling is rented, the corresponding marginal tax rate would be 24% and the tax amount would be 
MDH 5,100 (corresponding to an average tax rate of 17%). If the dwelling is owner-occupied, the base will 
be brought back to MDH 7,500, commanding a marginal tax rate of 16% and a tax amount of MDH 540 
only (corresponding to an average tax rate of 1.8%).   37
represent the main source of revenue for municipalities. In the context of decentralization and 
increasing responsibilities at the local level, a cut in the tax base having the highest revenue 
potential is a severe blow to municipal financial capacities. Transferring the tax burden to renters, 
while the ownership sector is thriving due to other favors, is bound to reduce revenues further. 
 
The main problems of incentives associated with these two types of taxes in Morocco (see SCET-
Urba-Systems, 2003) are linked to the method of tax collection and management. The legal 
parameters of the Taxe Urbaine (base, rates and exemptions) are dictated by the Central State and 
passed through the Finance Laws, rather than by the municipalities. The taxes are collected by the 
tax administration of the central government. The tax revenue is then returned to the 
municipalities where they were collected (less 10% retained by the Central State as 
administration and collection fees). Thus, municipalities in which taxes accrue have no real 
capacity or incentives to manage this source of revenues and are at times also reluctant to increase 
the tax paid home owners. These problems have been discussed for quite some time, but so far 
have not resulted in any concrete changes. 
 
 
Evaluation of Individual Subsidy Programs 
 
Based on the discussion above, the main housing subsidy programs have been ranked according 
to the nine criteria retained in the analysis. The results are aggregated in Table 6.The scale chosen 
here ranges from 1 to 5, with 1 denoting a very poor performance, and 5 an excellent 
performance. Figures are given instead of qualitative ratings only for aggregation purposes. 
Equivalent qualitative assessments could be as follows:  




5 Very  Good.   38
Table 6 : Performance of the housing subsidy system – detailed level - Morocco - 1995 
 




ncy  Incentives 
Targeting 
/Vertical 
Equity   Coverage  Efficiency Visibility 
Sustainabi
lity  Flexibility
Demand-side subsidies                 
Interest rate subsidies on 
mortgage loans  4.2  3 5  2  2 2 3  5 1 1 
Exemption of VAT on mortgage 
interests  1.5  3 5  //  2 2 3  2 3 3 
Income tax deduction on 
mortgage  interests  2.7  4 5  3  1 1 2  4 2 4 
Lowered  registration  fees  3.4  5 5  4  3 2 4  3 3 5 
Total  demand  side  11.7  3.8 5.0  //  2.1 1.8 3.1  3.8 2.1 3.1 
Supply-side subsidies                 
Low  VAT  rate  for  housing  19.0  5 4  //  1 2 2  2 3 2 
Exemption of VAT, social 
housing  and  self-construction  6.1  2 4  //  3 2 2  3 2 2 
Housing ministry Investment 
Budget  3.3  3 2  2  2 2 2  5 3 3 
Land subsidies to State-owned 
companies  14.7  2 1  1  2 1 1  1 2 3 
Total supply side  43.2  3.4  2.8  //  1.7 1.7 1.7  2.0 2.5 2.4 
Capital  subsidies                 
Cut of 75% on Tax base for local 
taxes  29.2  5 5  2  1 4 1  2 1 1 
Exemption of local taxes for new 
units  and  social  housing  2.7  5 5  //  1 3 1  2 3 3 
Capital  gains  provisions  13.2  2 3  1  1 1 2  1 3 4 
Total  capital  side  45.1  4.1 4.4  //  1.0 3.1 1.3  1.7 1.7 2.0 
Grand Total  100.0  3.8  3.8  //  1.4 2.3 1.7  2.1 2.1 2.3 
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3) Aggregate Results 
 
Figure 5 breaks down the estimated total expenditures for housing subsidies in 1995 into its main 
components. Different colors indicate, respectively, subsidies for housing construction (orange), 
housing demand (pink), and housing as capital (green). Figures have been extracted from Table 5.  
 


































A few striking facts emerge:  
 
-  Total subsidies amounted to MDH 4.8 billion annually (1.5% of Morocco’s GDP). Of 
those, only MDH 325 million (less than 7%) were subsidies on budget, and interest rate 
subsidies represented only 4% of the total of subsidies. 
 
-  Budget and fiscal expenditures on mortgages (interest rate subsidies, deduction of interest 
from taxable income) amounted to MDH 460 million, in spite of the weak development 
of the mortgage market. This shows that severe problems of sustainability would show up 
following the development of housing financing. 
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-  Land subsidies, arguably the less visible of all subsidies, amounted to twice the subsidies 
for budget or 13% of total subsidies. 
 
-  The distribution of subsidies was 39% for housing construction, 20% for housing 
demand, and 41% for housing as capital stock.. 
 
-  Cuts on local tax bases for homeowners and exemption of new units from the Taxe 
Urbaine represented MDH 1.3 billion, by far the highest tax expenditure.  
 
 
An average of the scores obtained by certain programs based on the various dimensions by broad 
category of subsidies allows a synthetic visualization of the system. Figure 6 shows the results of 
this aggregation. 
 






















Subsidies for housing demand clearly ranked first in terms of transparency, visibility and 
efficiency, and also fared better in terms of flexibility. Subsidies for housing as capital stock 
performed well in terms of simplicity and transparency, and relatively well in terms of coverage. 
However, this was achieved at the expense of efficient targeting. Efficiency, visibility and 
sustainability were also low. Lastly, subsidies for housing construction were ranked below 
average except in the case of administrative simplicity and transparency. As such, this type of 
transparency ranked lower than other types of subsidies. 
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4) Changes in housing policies between 1995 and 2002 
 
This section describes the main changes which took place in the legal, regulatory and fiscal 
environments of the sector between 1995 and 2002. Overall, the main trends were : 
 
-  The tendency to push tax exemptions further for builders (see below).
51  
 
-  In parallel, the support for development of a strong private construction industry, via tax 
and regulatory provisions. The idea was to create a setting in which the PPH could sell 
serviced land to private developers, which would cover the bulk of housing construction. 
 
-  The continuing intervention of the State in the housing sector, via publicly sponsored 
construction programs (Programme des 200 000 logements royaux). Resources from the 
FSH (see below) and continued provision of public land are the bases for the important 
new program for slum eradication, called “Villes sans Bidonvilles”, managed by the 
Ministry of Housing, which would span years 2004 to 2010. This program was included 
on the “usual” interventions of the Ministry of Housing, which continue to evolve as 
described in the previous sections.  
  
-  The development of housing finance, which followed the reform of the banking sector. In 
1996, the advantages of the Royal Decree of 1958 were extended to other banks, which 
rapidly began to compete in the mortgage market. This was encouraged by a macro-
economic context of decreasing interest rates, which dropped to around 13% in 1995, and 
to 8 or 9% in 2004. In this context, outstanding loans as a share of GDP stood at 7% in 
2003.he market share of the CIH declined to 30-35% of outstanding mortgages,oan to 
value (LTV) ratios dropped from 30-40% to 10%, currently sometimes to 0%. 
 
The decrease in interest rates and in LTV requirements resulted in increased affordability of 
housing. However, in conjunction with the increase of projects eligible for interest rates subsidies, 
this drop also caused a tremendous increase in the budgetary charges for interest rate subsidies, 
which rose to MDH 450 (US$50 million) per year in 2003. This sustainability issue was 
eventually resolved by eliminating this subsidy as of 2004. 
 
In 1999, through a provision of the Finance Law known as Article 19, private developers were 
granted total tax exemption (national and local) on construction of housing units (units valued at 
less than MDH 200,000). The only eligibility criteria to benefit from this measure was the 
commitment (in the form of an agreement between the developer and the Ministry of Housing) to 
construct 3,500 units within 5 years for the entire country. In 2001, this figure had decreased to 
2,500 units. Another constraint is that "grouping" between developers is prohibited. Thus, the 
provision is de facto limited to large developers. 
 
The last modification of the institutional framework took place during the year 2004, with the 
termination of interest rates subsidies. Initially, the system was to be replaced by upfront 
subsidies for homeowners. Technical assistance from the World Bank in 2002 and 2003 had led 
to a system of parameters for the upfront subsidy system, which had been approved in principle 
by the Ministry of Housing and Ministry of Finance. However, the project was eventually 
dropped. Even thus, interest rate subsidies will continue to be a burden for the State budget for 
                                                 
51 In 1996, for example, the first sale of social units (area < 100 m2 and value < MDH 200,000) was totally 
tax exempt on capital gains.   42
some time because loans already attributed will continue to benefit from subsidies. Therefore, 
subsidy payments will decrease only slowly and continue until at least 2015. 
Interest rates subsidies were “replaced” by a combination of two instruments: 
-  A Social Housing Fund (FSH) financed by a tax on cement to be used by Ministry of 
Housing, notably for National Program of Slum Eradication. 
-  Mortgage Guarantee Funds.  
 
The FSH will be a special fund, separate from the State’s main budget. The Fund will be 
replenished by a tax on cement (which price is controlled), of MDH 100 per ton. Given the 
current amount of local cement production, the tax is expected to generate about MDH 1 billion 
per year. The corresponding resources will be allocated to the FSH. Control of the FSH resources 
is less than the Ministry of Housing’s standard budget investment resources. The budget 
submitted to Parliament during the annual Finance Law process contains only a list of possible 
uses of FSH resources for the coming year. The allocation of resources to those uses is not 
specified and is determined only during the course of the year by the Ministry of Housing, and 
subject to Ministry of Finance approval for disbursements. 
 
Thus, the FSH is not very transparent. In comparison, another special off-budget fund, the 
FNAET, is very opaque.
52 On a positive note, the FSH, based on a stable and increasing base, 
represents a reliable resource for the Ministry of Housing, and totals more than twice the 
Ministry’s own investment budget. And is also less subject to budgetary arbitrages, given its para-
fiscal nature. Resources from the FSH and the continued provision of public land are at the basis 
of the new program of slum eradication, called “Villes sans Bidonvilles”, managed by the 
Ministry of Housing. This program was added to normal interventions by the Ministry of 
Housing, which continue as described above.  
 
The Mortgage Guarantee Funds were designed to provide an incentive for banks to provide 
services to the low-income population by eliminating a degree of credit risk on mortgages. 
Initially, three funds were to be created which translated into a segmentation of the population 
frequently used in Morocco: 
-  one Fund (FOGALOGE Public) was for civil servants; 
-  a second fund (FOGALOGE Privé) for wage earners of the private sector; and 
-  a third fund (FOGARIM) for households with irregular / informal sources of income. 
 
The first Fund was created and capitalized on by the State from the primary budget. The 
government was committed to capitalizing on the Fund up to MDH 350 million. The second Fund 
does not exist today. Initial negotiations between the Ministry of Finance and private sector 
representatives led to believe that the Fund would be financed by both parties. However, after the 
announcement of interest rate subsidy elimination, negotiations broke down. An agreement has 
still not been reached with the private sector for the capitalization of the Fund. The third Fund, 
FOGARIM, was created in February 2004 and will be capitalized by the State. A first tranche of 
MDH 200 million was to be deposited in 2004 from the FSH resources. The government 
committed to capitalize the Fund up to MDH 600 million in future.  
 
The main characteristics of the Fund for informal households, FOGARIM, are the following :  
1)  Only banks are eligible (not financial institutions or micro-credit institutions). 
2)  Eligible loans are: FRM with fixed payments only, with a cap on maximum monthly 
payments equal to MDH 1,000 (about US$100). Maximum LTV can reach 100%.  The 
specific LTV amount is left to the discretion of banks. 
                                                 
52 Subsidies for current PPH expenditures have been allocated through this Fund for some time.   43
3)  The Fund covers 70% of the credit risk (principal balance at the date of default). 
4)  The Fund is not conceived as an insurance tool, at least at start-up. Specifically, banks 
pay no actuarial premium for each loan they guarantee. 
 
To summarize this discussion, Figure 7 gives a simple description of the institutional organization 
of the current housing production sector. 
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No economic evaluation of the Article 19 program is yet available. In particular,  systematic 
studies have not yet been undertaken concerning the impact of Article 19 on housing supply. 
However, the following comments can be made: 
 
-  In theory, the importance of the subsidy for units valued at less than MDH 200,000 
compared to more expensive units should have caused substantial distortions in the 
housing supply. One should expect to witness the quasi disappearance of units with 
values just above MDH 200,000, up to a floor value above which investment is again 
profitable. 
 
-  The fiscal burden is enormous. The cost of the 110,000 units planned in the program 
agreed at the beginning of 2004 in terms of national taxes only,
53 was estimated to be 
MDH 4 billion, or MDH 36,000 per unit. In spite of the fact that the VAT exemption 
already existed for social housing units, the differential cost was still MDH 1.5 billion, or 
MDH 14,000 per unit. However, to this should be added all the revenue lost by the 
municipalities (tax on land division operations, tax on parcelling out, and construction 
tax)
54. Since locally generated revenues for municipalities are scarce, this is an important 
parameter to consider. 
 
-  As noted above, the subsidy is tailored to big developers and thus relatively inequitable 
for smaller developers. As a consequence, only those developers who have access to the 
largest markets can benefit from the tax cut. At the beginning of 2004, in the 50 projects 
agreed upon by the Ministry of Housing, 70% of the projects were located in Casablanca. 
 
-  As always, the ceiling value on housing units created agency problems. Those concerned 
the monitoring of prices (while the list price was 200,000 MDH or slightly under, “real” 
prices were higher), but also the monitoring of firms having signed conventions. The 
Article 19 did not include provisions in case a firm could not provide the minimal 
number of required units within five years. What action needs to be taken in such cases?
55 
 
-  However, prices of social housing units in Casablanca have in fact decreased sharply 
since 2002, and the trend is continuing. Units are now advertised as low as MDH 
160,000, and local sources report the decreasing incidence of bribes. Without a sound 
economic evaluation, whether increased competition between developers is a 
consequence of Article 19 or simply traduces the critical mass reached by the private 
construction sector cannot be told. Nonetheless, the comparison of the magnitude of the 
recent fall in prices of social units (about MDH 40,000) to that of the incremental cost of 
the Article 19 (MDH 14,000) seems to suggest that the last layer of subsidies helped in 
eliminating rents and increasing competition. 
 
                                                 
53 These include stamp duties paid by the developer on land and by the buyer on housing unit ; VAT on 
housing construction ; and corporate tax for the developer. 
54 Social units were already exempt of construction tax before 1999. 
55 The choice seems to lie between forgiving, which would be equivalent to giving up on the quantitative 
quota, or reclaiming all the tax rebates corresponding to the units constructed since the signature f the 
convention, which could result in bankruptcy of the developer.   45
Due to perceived high costs for the State revenues, the article 19 has been threatened several 
times when it came to passing the finance Law. This is likely to be the case again in the future, as 
the program is not in a stationary state and continues to grow. In all cases the phasing out of the 
program should be designed carefully, since its brutal suppression would imply a large negative 
shock to the economic and financial environment of the construction sector. 
 
 
Mortgage Guarantee Funds 
 
FOGALOGE Public is a replication on a bigger scale of an existing Fund managed by the 
Fondation Hassan II, the FOGALEF, aimed at giving subsidized loans to low-income civil 
servants from the Ministry of Education. The main characteristic of loans covered by those funds 
is that payments are directly deducted from the borrowers’ payrolls, thanks to an agreement 
between the banks and the Treasury. Hence credit risk, intrinsically low for this category of 
households
56 , is further reduced. The usefulness of the FOGALOGE Public is thus questionable.  
 
The government’s expectations from FOGARIM were high. The Fund was to be the miracle 
solution to suddenly give access to housing finance to households working in the informal sector, 
and in particular to the future beneficiaries of the slum eradication program VSB. The official 
rhetoric presented the creation of the Fund as an “exchange” for the late interest rate subsidies. 
However, interest rate subsidies were useful in bridging financing gaps for low-income groups. 
By contrast, the Guarantee Fund is aimed at covering credit risk, and should not be expected to 
result in improved affordability of housing. Increased affordability could only come from a 
decrease in interest rates due to the shifting out of credit risk. However, this cannot be higher than 
a few dozens of basis points, which stays short of the previous interest rate subsidies. In that 
sense, the creation of the Guarantee funds has not solved the financing issue created by the 
suppression of interest rate subsidies. In an attempt to lower monthly payments compared to 
previous mortgage types, the government wanted the banks to increase the duration of mortgages, 
from 15 years to 25 or 30 years. 
 
In June 2004, no credit had been guaranteed, though the technical arrangements had been made 
and tested by the managing company and the participating banks. It is thus too soon to make a 
sound judgment on the efficiency of FOGARIM. However, the following remarks can be made. 
 
First, some parameters of the Fund constitute bad incentives for participating banks and 
households:  
 
-  The possibility let to banks to go up to 100% LTV is very risky. International experience 
shows that LTV is by far the main factor driving default risk. Default rates grow 
exponentially with LTV worldwide. Since the groups targeted by FOGARIM are not well 
known to the banks yet, imposing an upper limit to LTV as an eligibility condition would 
sound as a good incentive. 
 
-  The rate of coverage of the credit risk (70%) is very high by international standards. 
Usual rates range from 20% to 40%. With such a high coverage, incentives for banks to 
act in case of default could be limited. If this happens to be true, it could cause serious 
moral hazard problems as time goes by. 
 
                                                 
56 Income of civil servants is known in advance with almost no uncertainty. Moreover, in practice civil 
servants in Morocco benefit from a lifetime employment guarantee which lowers default risks.   46
-  The fact that no actuarial premium per guaranteed credit is paid by participating banks 
makes the Fund distinct from an insurance device, at the risk of being perceived as a 
subsidy product, giving incentives to the banks not to assess credit risk correctly 
 
-  The fact that only FRMs are eligible to the guarantee bears potentially huge interest rate 
risk, exacerbated by the extended duration of the loans. Due to the absence of long term 
liabilities in Morocco, the main banks have not been able to properly hedge interest rate 
risks. This is not perceived as a big risk by the government in the present context.
57 
However, interest rates may rise again in the short future.The fact that only fixed 
repayment schedules are allowed, combined with the cap on maximum monthly 
payments, could be a problem for categories of households having highly seasonal or 
irregular income.More generally, most of the official target population of the Fund has 
not even access to a bank account yet. Banks will start lending by focusing on "high 
income" informal categories (grocers, taxi drivers, etc.) which they know. Extensions to 
lower income groups of the informal population, if it happens, can only be gradual and 
slow. Thus, the major part of the beneficiaries of the VSB program will not be covered by 
FOGARIM. 
 
6) Comparison of the housing subsidy system in 1995 and 2002 
 
Table 7 presents the costs of the housing subsidies system prevailing in Morocco in 2002, which 
is the last year for which figures are available. As related above, the last decade has witnessed the 
extension of tax cuts to housing producers. Tax expenditures for the sector now represent around 
MDH 6.5 billion per year (1.8% of GDP), constituting the bulk of housing subsidies, whose total 
is estimated around MDH 9 billion per year (2.6% of GDP). The growth of tax expenditures has 
been driven by the drive to push social housing out of the tax base (first partially, then totally), a 
trend which culminated with Article 19. On demand side, the development of the mortgage 
market has mechanically pushed up fiscal expenditures incurred on the income tax, due to 
generous deductibility provisions. This latter trend will continue as access to credit expands 
further. 
 
Figure 8 breaks down the estimated expenditures on housing subsidies into its main components. 
Different colors signal respectively subsidies to housing production (orange), to housing demand 
(pink), and to housing as capital (green). The comparison with figure 5 reveals the following 
trends:  
 
-  The repartition of subsidies shifted over the years towards production subsidies, which 
now represent 44% of total subsidies, and demand subsidies (33% of the total). This is 
explained both by the growth of these two types of subsidies in absolute value, but also 
by the relative stability of the third type of subsidies. Local taxes have not grown rapidly 
over the years. However, Cuts on local tax base for homeowners and exemption of new 
units from Taxe Urbaine is still the highest tax expenditure. 
-  Budget and fiscal expenditures on mortgages (interest rate subsidies, deduction of interest 
from taxable income) now amount to MDH 1,580 million, including the remnant of 
interest rate subsidies and the capitalization of the Mortgage Guarantee Fund by the State. 
This has more than tripled in seven years, due to the rapid development of the rental 
market. 
 
                                                 
57 Interest rates have been steadily declining for ten years, and the share of mortgages in the balance sheet 
of banks is still limited.   47
Table 7 : Housing Subsidies in Morocco – Detailed list and amount as of 2002 
 
Category  Provision Subsidy 
Amount 
(million Mdh) 
Fiscal Expenditures    
Registration  Fees  Reduced rate : 2.5% instead of 5% for dwellings with 
value under Dh 350,000 
 
  Reduced rate : 1.25% instead of 5% for dwellings with 
value under Dh 180,000 
(total)     
1428 
VAT  Reduced VAT rate for housing sector (14% instead of 
20%)  
1020 
  No VAT on self-construction  340 
  No VAT on social housing (area < 100 m2 and value , 
200,000 DH) 
177 
  Exemption of VAT on interests for mortgages  77 
Income Tax  Deduction of mortgage interests from taxable income  602 
  Deduction of 40% from rental income  n.a. 
  Deduction of mortgage interests and capital from taxable 
income, for wage earners buying social dwellings (Value 
< 500,000 Dhs)  
406 
Tax  on  Capital  Gains  Total exemption after 10 years possession, partial 
exemption after 5 years possession 
700 
  Exemption of the first sale of social unit (area < 100 m2 
and value , 200,000 DH) 
n.a. 
Taxe Urbaine  Tax base cut by 75% for homeowners  228 
  Exemption for new units for the first 5 years  100 
  Exemption for social housing for all the duration of the 
loan  
13 
Taxe d’édilité  Tax base cut by 75% for homeowners  1,100 
Article 19 (differential 
cost)* 
Construction of social housing units exempt form all taxes 
and duties (national and local) 
300 
Total   6,491 
Direct Subsidies    
Mortgage Guarantee 
Funds 
Capitalization from the State for a 10-year period  95 
Housing Ministry 
Investment Budget 
Investment expenditures for slum upgrading and 
infrastructure servicing of the informal sector programs 
450 
FSH  Dedicated Housing Fund (funded by a tax on cement)  1,000 
Interest rate subsidies on 
mortgages 
Still applies to loans originated until 2004 
 
400 
Exchange rate risks  Treasury covers the exchange rate risk on loans serving to 
finance social housing programs 
20 
Total   1,965 
Land subsidies  Provision of land parcels from the State domain to public 
developers for construction of social housing, at prices 
below market 
800 
Grand Total    9,256 
* The differential cost is calculated with reference to preexisting fiscal provisions for social housing  
Source : World Bank calculations (2004). 
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The 2002 counterpart to Figure 5 is given by Figure 9. The two graphs are strikingly similar. The 
three types of subsidies rank in the same order under the various criteria. The only noticeable 
changes concern an increase in flexibility, both for demand and supply-side subsidies, and a 
decrease in transparency for production subsidies. For demand-side subsidies, the increase in 
flexibility corresponds to the growth of subsidies related to low registration fees and deductions 
of mortgage interests from taxable income. However, as noticed above, flexibility in this case is 
perhaps more theoretical than real : although the regressive characteristics of the Moroccan 
income tax deductions have been known for a while, the corresponding provisions have not 
changed and have not even seriously been challenged. Nonetheless, flexibility is going to increase 
in the future, due to the progressive phasing out of interest rate subsidies. For production 
subsidies, the increase in flexibility comes from the FSH, whose para-fiscal nature makes very 
easy to use for different purposes. However, dedicated funds of this kind are very opaque and 
have bad incentives properties. This explains the decrease in transparency for production 
subsidies. 
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This paper presents a systematic methodology to evaluate systems of housing subsidies. The 
methodology is applied to the system of housing subsidies prevailing in Morocco in 1995 and 
2002. The various parts of the housing subsidy system are described, and rated along public 
finance criteria. The framework used here provides a synthetic overview of the housing subsidy 
system of Morocco. It may be used to compare the Moroccan system to those of similar countries. 
To illustrate this possibility, Figure 10 presents some of the results in a different manner.  
 
Figure 10 : Expenditures on Housing Subsidies by Type – comparison 1995-2002 
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The paper shows that the most visible subsidies have been neither the most inefficient nor the 
most resource consuming for the state. Examination of changes since 1995 shows that while the 
most visible subsidies have received nearly all the attention, large invisible subsidies remain at 
the heart of Morocco’s housing policy. For example, the decision to phase out interest rate 
subsidies was accompanied by the creation of the Fund for Social Housing, whose cost is twice as 
large, and whose characteristics may lead to economic inefficiencies and to greater opacity for 
Moroccan taxpayers.   51
Like all exercises of synthesis, this one potentially faces the criticism of overlooking prominent 
aspects of the housing subsidy systems. It is worth emphasizing that our battery of criteria is just 
a practical tool for summarizing various aspects of particular programs and comparing them. 
Assessing the various aspects of a particular program, which is the basic input needed to apply 
our methodology, still remains a complicated exercise to be undertaken by specialists. We 
nonetheless believe that our framework can be used in useful ways, the first of which is to 
provide a simple pedagogical tool allowing more comparable studies on different countries or 
programs. For policymakers or governments seeking ways to improve their housing policies, the 
aggregation technique provided in this paper provides a synthetic way to assess the basic features 
of the housing subsidy system as a whole, but also a quick way to compare the system to those of 
neighbors or similar countries. The framework may also help go beyond the usual “best -worst 
practice” presentation. A particular program may be ranked high along some criteria, and not so 
well along others. Even programs widely recognized as “best practices” could be enhanced in 
some dimension. Practitioners may then want to address other comparable programs that fare 
better in that particular dimension.  
 
Last but not least, we believe that the very nature of the evaluation exercise forces policymakers 
and experts to consider explicitly how and why they believe a program performs against a 
specific standard. The aggregation exercise in turn forces one to look at all kinds of subsidies, 
visible and less visible. As emphasized above, very large implicit subsidies often receive far less 
attention than they would deserve, simply because their visibility is low. In that case, focusing on 
more visible but less important types of subsidies can lead to inefficient use of money and loss of 
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Appendix : Table 1 
 
Table 1 : Proposed criteria for assessing housing subsidies programs 
 





- Is the subsidy easy and relatively inexpensive to manage ? 
- Are users aware of the existence and modalities of the program ? 
- does an “average” household/ firm need help (social worker, 
administration) to register in the program? 
- Direct and indirect administrative cost / subsidy amount 
- Qualitative or Survey assessment  
 
Transparency  - Are there well-defined eligibility criteria to the subsidy ? 
- Are responsibilities in subsidy attribution clearly defined ? 
- Is subsidy attribution managed by an independent body ?  
- existence of eligibility and participation criteria, and 
nature (law, decree, regulation, rule internal to the 
implementation agency, etc.) 
- proportion of participants chosen on open and known 
rules (vs. quotas of administration, local authorities, etc.)  
- knowledge of those in the population 









What are the incentives of stakeholders (State, local governments, 
households, firms) to use but not abuse the subsidy ? 
- Are individuals / institutions responsible for choosing participants 
in the program accountable ? 
- Are individuals or institutions in charge of the implementation of 
the program given adequate financial and technical means ?  
- Do institutions in charge of the program have incentives to keep 
the program under control (financial mass, cost recovery,...)? 
- Does the program receive a large support ? Who supports it and 





Ad hoc qualitative analysis of incentives. 
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Table 1 (continued) : Proposed criteria for assessing housing subsidies programs 
 
Criterion  Questions to be answered 
 
Measurement indicators (examples=* - this is 
not clear)  
Targeting / Vertical 
equity (redistribution) 
- What is the distribution of transfers (explicit or implicit) implied 
by the subsidy ? 
- Who are beneficiaries of the subsidy in theory ? 
- Are the most needy covered by the subsidy ? 
- Estimation of distribution of transfers (explicit or 
implicit) implied by the subsidy. Depending on the case :  
- Estimation from tax files 
- Econometric calculation from survey data 
- Use of administrative files on beneficiaries  
- comparison of official targets and effective target 
possible with type of subsidy and implementation chosen. 
Coverage/horizontal 
equity 
- What share of the targeted population is covered by the program ? 
- Does the subsidy introduce different treatments for different kinds 
of households / firms in the target population ?  
- share of the targeted population covered by the 
program. 
- subsidy reach in different groups of households / firms 
within target group. 





- Could the same resources be used more efficiently ? 
 
- Which economic margins are affected by the subsidy? 
Depending on the case considered: 
- partial equilibrium calculation 
- integration of subsidies in complete models of the tax 
and benefits system 
 
Ad hoc qualitative assessment 
 
Ad hoc approach, e.g. : 
- calculation of multiplier effect of public spending on the 
program, 
- calculation of effective tax rates on investment in 
different sectors* 
- econometric calculation of crowding out effects* 
   57
Table 1 (continued) : Proposed criteria for assessing housing subsidies programs 
 
Criterion  Questions to be answered 
 
Measurement indicators (examples=*) 
Visibility  - What is the degree of political visibility of the subsidy ? By order 
of decreasing visibility : subsidy on budget, fiscal subsidy, implicit 
subsidy 
- Are citizens / taxpayers aware of the true cost of the subsidy? 
- Type of subsidy : cash / kind subsidy 
- proportion of total subsidy accounted for in State/ Local 
Government Budgets 
- evaluation of subsidy program at government level 
(local – regional – national) 
Sustainability  - Is the subsidy program sustainable in the long run ? 
  - Has today’s program a long-run implication of State budget 
equilibrium ? 
- Simulation of medium-run or long-run costs / 
expenditures on the program 
- impact of today’s expenditures on future government 
liabilities  
Flexibility  - Can the program be modified or stopped without major political 
unrest ? 
- Can the program be modified or stopped without major disruptive 
effects on the economy ? 
- Ad hoc qualitative analysis. 
 
- evaluation of dependence of housing supply and 
demand on the subsidy* 
 
 
 